

There is no shortage of plans or principles. No fewer than four disarmament plans, and two sets of principles have been advanced in the past twelve months. Despite the Soviet withdrawal there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the Ten-Nation forum, whose working methods could be adjusted by agreement. Canada has already suggested the appointment of a neutral Chairman with this in mind, and would always be prepared to examine other constructive suggestions. What is lacking is not appropriate machinery, but mutual confidence and a genuine will on the part of the Soviet side to negotiate. That confidence can be promoted by dispelling the kind of secrecy which clouds preparations for war and keeps alive the fear of surprise attack. The leader of the Soviet Union speaks often of co-existence. There can be no easy co-existence with the unknown -- no easy co-existence where on one side there is a curtain of concealment.

Canada is prepared to make available for international inspection and control any part of Canadian Arctic territory in exchange for a comparable concession on the part of the U.S.S.R. Why has the leader of the Soviet Union, if he believes truly in disarmament and peace, ignored this offer?

What could illustrate more clearly the cynicism of the Soviet Government in the field of disarmament than Mr. Khrushchov's attempt to make a resumption of disarmament talks conditional upon acceptance of the demands of the Soviet Union for a fundamental change in the office of the Chief Executive of the United Nations? This is just another illustration of the uncompromising rigidity of the Soviet Union.

If we are ever to cope with the growing problem of disarmament, we must make a start on actual measures, consistent with the more comprehensive plans related to ultimate goals.

As to the kind of measures which deserve the most urgent attention, I have frequently had occasion to urge publicly that immediate consideration should be given to the following: