

inappropriate or in need of refurbishment or tied with a request for financial reimbursement that was far beyond the value of the equipment being offered. In this regard, the UN needs to establish some basic standards of troop training and equipment below which the UN will not envisage entertaining a nation offering those troops. Similarly, the UN needs to establish basic standards for the provision of equipment which will ensure that they are sufficiently serviceable, and set out the ranges of payment to nations for various types of equipment.

The changes within DPKO over the past several years have been substantive, for example the high profile 24 hour a day and 7 days a week Operations Centre. In November 1993 a high level in-house review of DPKO took place which came up with a number of further recommendations that DPKO is attempting to address within the constraints of staffing and financial resources. It must be emphasised that this evolution of the past couple of years has occurred even while DPKO was being called upon to mount ever more and substantially larger peacekeeping operations. That they have managed to do both with a fair degree of success is a credit to the staff of DPKO and the willingness of many of them to work long hours of overtime.

DPKO is clearly one of those few parts of the UN that not only requires urgent increases in staff and resources if they are to improve their effectiveness, but who deserve to be rewarded for both fulfilling the peacekeeping tasks at hand and for their attitude and track record on internal reform.

Conclusion

The conflict resolution and peacekeeping response in the months immediately after April 6th was a failure. The fundamental lack of political will by almost every UN member was most evident in the Security Council. Many countries used the crisis to establish positions on issues (eg. peacekeeping, the role of the Security Council) that had little to do with Rwanda. The rapid withdrawal of most of UNAMIR once foreign nationals were evacuated was followed by a glacial half hearted reinforcement of UNAMIR. At best UNAMIR did little for Rwandans during this period, and at worse, increased the hardline Hutu perception of world indifference to them orchestrating massacres and refugee flows. **The problem this time was not the UN structure or staff, but its member states.**