

combatant commands” through the world.⁹² In setting up USJFCOM, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, appointed an Army National Guard Brigadier-General as the first commanding general of Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). “The JTF-CS will ensure Department of Defense assets are prepared to respond to requests for support from a Lead Federal Agency such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency.”⁹³

The CPI includes working with other countries and international organizations, and Presidents Clinton and Yelstin issued a declaration on the need to deal with proliferation. These U.S. policies were adopted by NATO, which established three proliferations groups, the Joint Committee on Proliferation, the Senior Political Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation. But while the CPI found support amongst American allies and developed countries, the developing world saw it as “exacerbating national security concerns by widening the gap between the military capabilities of the developed and developing countries.”⁹⁴ John Simpson points to “the development by the U.S. of military options for counter-proliferation purposes” and the development of tactical and strategic defence systems, as a source of friction between the nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states, with regard to the future of the NPT.⁹⁵

Of interest from a non-proliferation standpoint, is the relationship between the RMA and the CPI. It is evident that the United States will employ its RMA technologies in defensive and offensive measures designed to deal with states or groups who might acquire and use WMDs. In this sense, the salience of nuclear weapons would diminish and further cuts would be possible. This in turn could assist the NPT by allowing for further cuts in the American nuclear arsenal. But as discussed below, it also appears that the counter-proliferation objective could serve to reinforce the continuing utility of nuclear weapons, thus in turn undermine non-proliferation efforts.

The failure of the Senate to ratify the CTBT indicates a reluctance in some quarters in the United States to go further on arms control. Moreover, as Manning himself notes, average annual spending on nuclear weapons research and development in the United States by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Atomic Energy Commission, which was \$3.7 billion during the Cold War, is expected to average \$4.6 billion over the period 1998-2008. And this does not include Department of Defence costs “or those associated with the production of nuclear weapons materials.” In 1996, “DOE’s research development, testing and materials production programs were reclassified as

⁹² USACom Redesignated to U.S. Joint Forces Command,” , p. 8.

⁹³ “Guard General to Command Joint Civil Support Task Force,” *National Guard*, (53) (November 1999): p. 12.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, pp.33-39.

⁹⁵ John Simpson, Daryl Howlett and Emily Bailey, “1997 and All That: Multinational Diplomacy and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” *Contemporary Security Policy* (17) (December 1996), p. 341.