


integration of former resistance fighters and homeland armies will involve an increase in defence spending for the next three years, and will not allow reductions in the overall size of the armed forces.



What this suggests is that a regional effort concerted with outside partners could make significant progress in reducing the region's military burden and entrenching the transition to representative rule that is well underway, especially as some of the acute interstate and internal conflicts in the region are resolved. A closer look at the data in Figures 23 to 26 illustrates where some of the key points for attention may lie.

Figure 23, which ranks states by the percentage of GNP devoted to the military, shows clearly that the two most important outlier states in 1993 were Mozambique and Angola, both of which spent more than seven percent of GNP to the armed forces. Continued international support (and pressure) for the post-civil war transitions in these two states, should encourage them to reduce spending to approach more closely the regional norm of less than 3.5 percent. Somewhat worrying, however, are the situations in Botswana and Zimbabwe, where spending is still above 4 percent of GNP (5.9 and 4.3 percent respectively), still well above the regional average. This is somewhat surprising, in light of the fairly dramatic transitions that