

The allies are also going to have to face some very unwelcome problems. Even without an arms agreement, confidence in the strategy of flexible response, which we adopted 20 years ago, has pretty well collapsed. One reason is that, for various reasons, partly technical and partly political, nobody really believes that you can control a nuclear war once the first nuclear weapon is used. General Rogers has made this point as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

Secondly, there has been no agreement within the Alliance, since McNamara and I first persuaded them to adopt the strategy of flexible response, about how to operate it. We could not even agree on the first step of the nuclear "ladder of escalation". Indeed, the Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM), which were supposed to be the first step, are now being withdrawn from Europe because nobody could see any use for them or, if they could see a use, it was not one on which the Alliance could agree.

The third reason is also very important humanly, and that is that nobody, to my knowledge, since the war, has believed that the Russians were likely to launch a general attack out of the blue on NATO forces in Europe. But, there has been a very justified worry ever since the war that fighting might break out between NATO and East European forces as a result, perhaps, of an explosion in Eastern Europe, such as the rising in Berlin or Hungary, or the troubles in Poland or Czechoslovakia, or perhaps because of troubles in the Third World such as in the Middle East, which might spread like wildfire without real control by governments. In such a situation deterrence, by definition, is irrelevant. The fighting has started, and the question then is how you limit it without using nuclear weapons.

The big question which the allies have to face is, first of all, getting away from almost immediate use of nuclear weapons, which is implicitly current NATO strategy, to no early use, then, hopefully, to no first use of nuclear weapons, and, finally, to a strategy which depends on a non-provocative conventional deterrent and does not involve the use of nuclear weapons at all. I think, myself, that such a strategy is possible even within the economic constraints which are inevitable for the West, given our democratic systems. I have lectured at the invitation of the American National Defense University and the NATO Defence College on this, followed, I am glad to say, rather than preceded, by General Rogers.