

ould lead to his
representative of a
d thereby inflict
ignance and in-
character, as well as
e sacred. An
especially in so

fully divulge
n the councils
n permission of
n refuse to per-
tain the grounds
t minister pre-
e fundamental
nce, that every
he is proved
therefore, to a
e of explaining
drawal from the
ount to a justifi-
so received by
permission, a
er for his con-
t would go a-

y cannot a min-
permission of
ly on account
in order that
ent on the case,
m the facts in-
no witness can
side. Every
when brought
ore be, what in
ed "a case of
facts of which
admit—draw-
n order by mu-
to pronounce
g to the facts

official connex-
him and his
mutual consent,
be stated by
wn is not re-
sponsible,
sition or capa-
r his conduct
explanation—
acts agreed up-
himself, and
on of his So-
of Parliament
g to facts thus

emarks bring
Charles Met-
parliamentary
their resigna-
fullest justice,
advantage, I
adest grounds
r alleged dif-
ernment in a
; but assume
ereign of the
vin and Mr.

Lafontaine to be Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington, and the Canadian Legislature to be the British Parliament. They are now British Ministers in a British Parliament—and their proceedings must be judged according to the law of British ministerial and parliamentary practice since the revolution of 1688. Judged by that law, I shall show that they have committed errors which involve not only the violation of the principles of Responsible Government, but, if successful, the political ruin of one of the noblest characters in the British Empire.

Did, then, our Canadian Sir Robert Peel and Duke of Wellington come before Parliament with what has been above defined to be a case or cases of facts, and with the royal permission to state those facts? If so, where is the *proof*? The answer is their assertion. But no man, or company of men, can be witnesses in their own case. Their assertion, therefore, is no *proof*; and the reiteration of it a million times leaves its assertion still—does not transmit it into proof. In all cases of dispute or difference, the plaintiff and defendant, whether they respectively consist of one or many individuals, are assumed to be on an equal footing. Their mutual statements are equal, and therefore balance each other—amount to nothing—are not taken into the account. It will be admitted that the Crown is at least equal to its advisers. Where then is the proof that they had the Crown's permission to make those allegations? Without enumerating particulars, I will notice, as an example, two of those *explanatory* allegations. The late Counsellors assert that the Crown holds views incompatible with the constitution, as established by the resolution of September, 1841, and that in its acts, it has deviated from that constitution, as thus established. The Crown protests against the sentiments and acts thus ascribed to it. Assuming then for the moment, contrary to all precedent, that the Crown, instead of being incapable of doing wrong, is capable of violating the established constitution, both theoretically and practically, and can be arraigned for it before a Canadian Legislature, where is the *proof* of its guilt? If a horse-thief or murderer is entitled to be adjudged innocent until he is proved guilty, is not the Crown entitled to at least an equal privilege? Would a jury convict an alleged thief or murderer upon the assertion of the *Crown*, who is the prosecutor in such cases? And is the Crown to be convicted upon the assertion of *its prosecutors*. And would the Crown give permission to accuse itself—and to accuse itself of opinions and acts against which it protests? And where is their permission to state those facts?

But this is only the commencement of what I have to say on this extraordinary business. To make the case more plain, and perfectly intelligible to every reader, I will select British precedent—the very last which has occurred in England, of a minister resigning on account of difference of opinion with his sovereign. I allude to the resignation of

Sir Robert Peel in 1839, (for Lord John Russell and his colleagues resigned in 1841 on account of their difference with a parliamentary majority, and not on account of any difference between them and their Sovereign.)

And here, to remove every obscurity from the question, I beg to make a preliminary remark on the mode of official communication between the Crown, and its servants, or between public officers and individuals. In all such cases—in all enlightened governments—no communication is considered official which is not in *writing*. Cabinet consultations, ordinarily, may be verbal, for the Cabinet is a body not known in law. It is with the acts of the Government, and not with the modes of intercourse among its members, that the Parliament has to do. And of those acts, written documents are the only legitimate proof. If the reader, for example, were to have even interviews with the Sovereign or his ministers, on any subject, all this would be only preparatory and preliminary to official correspondence and action. It would be necessary for him to commit the material parts of his verbal statements to writing, and get a written answer; and nothing more than what was written would ever be recognised as official or binding. If private conversations were admitted as official, endless misunderstandings and confusion would ensue. When Lord Ashburton came to America to negotiate on the boundary question, his Lordship and Mr. Webster had several day's private conversations, and learned each other's views, and agreed on every material point, before they even commenced their official correspondence on the subject. Their private conversations were for themselves alone; their written correspondence was for the public as well as themselves. The conversation of official men are often reported through the press, and are sometimes referred to in official correspondence; but they are of no authority any further than the parties to whom they are attributed choose to admit.

This mode of official intercourse is the dictate of prudence as well as usage, and especially in any matter which may by possibility become the subject of public discussion and official proceeding.

How then did Sir Robert Peel proceed on a similar occasion, only one more simple, and therefore requiring less precision and explicitness? He does not ask his Sovereign to come to any understanding with him as to whether she would in future make or "not make appointments prejudicial to his influence"—he leaves each case to stand upon its own merits and to be decided as it might occur; but he advises Her Majesty to remove certain ladies of her bedchamber. She declines, and asserts her right to retain them—a right which Sir Robert does not question.—He then respectfully declines accepting a seat in her Majesty's councils.

But does he stop there? No. British practice and common sense required him to do much more. He then reduced his verbal advice to writing, with the reasons for it, and