

answering it. More specifically, by framing the question as a process in which (an essentialised) international community merely responds to the "security problems of the world as we now find it", Evans reduces the parameters of the debate to a traditional epistemological equation, one which reformulates the spectator theory of knowledge in terms of a new rational subject (the homogenised "international community") confronting an objectified, independently existing "world as we now find it", whose vicissitudes *we* (the international community) can only respond to.

From this (meta)theoretical foundation Evans responds predictably enough to the world 'out there' in representing it in the axiomatic liberal-realist terms of the neo-neo debate. Thus, the world is now characterised by an "unprecedented level of complex interdependence between states" and a "shift in national agendas whereby economic well being now supersedes preparation against military threat".<sup>44</sup> Policy prescriptions naturally follow from this, in particular a 'cooperative security' perspective centred on the premise that security problems in the future have their solutions in the proliferation and influence of liberal regimes and institutions. More precisely, the antidote to Cold War realpolitik for Evans (as it was for Bull and Wight) is the accelerated development of a cultural homogeneity within the international community, based on a global convergence toward Western institutional structures and values and capitalist economic logic. For Evans, moreover, this convergence process is entirely consistent with the flow of (post-Cold War) global history and the inexorable shift towards Western forms of political and economic governance. A process already very evident as:

across national borders things are being done more alike, and...institutions, practices and outlooks are becoming more alike-as a result of which countries, cultures and peoples are becoming less alien to each other ...[and] they are *beginning to learn* that their best interests are advanced not by a culture of conflict, but by a culture of cooperation.<sup>45</sup> (my emphasis)

There are a number of questions left begging by this observation at the core of the 'cooperative security' perspective. The most important for now is whether it represents a substantial enough conceptual or empirical basis for Australia's new global and regional agenda in the 21st century. I maintain that it does not, that neither in intellectual nor policy terms is it very substantial at all. In intellectual terms, I suggest, it follows a long tradition of representing the world as it *ought to be*, in terms of the way it *is*. In this sense it intersects with the perspectives of Woodrow Wilson,

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid. 1993 p.183

<sup>45</sup>Ibid