[35] "Because the threats posed to U.S. forces overseas, friends and allies are far greater than comparable threats to the U.S. homeland," Michael Krepon observes, "theater missile defences have become far more important than national missile defences." "Moving Away From MAD," pp.84-85.

[36] European missile and radar manufacturers have said that they are interested above all in developing TMD capabilities with technology that incorporates proven missiles and radar systems. See Paul Beaver, "Europeans Ready to Support U.S. Missile Defense Program," *Jane's at DSEI*, September 10, 2001; "Chirac für taktishe Raketenabwehr," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 8, 2001, available at : http://www.nzz/ch/2001/06/09; On PAAMS, see http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/2407.html and http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Bunker/9452/paams.htm .

[37] Sokolsky, pp.48-49; James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense*, (Washington DC: Brookings, 2001), pp.29-49. Boost-phase missile defense offers the capacity to shield the United States and its European allies against missile threats of any range. However, it is also in many respects the most ambitious form of missile defense and entails political, technical, and operational problems. Additionally, it involves some of the most futuristic and unproven technology, such as airborne laser (ABL); to function on a day-to-day peacetime basis, ABL and escort aircraft would have to be on continuous patrol. Enormous expense, in other words, is built into both its technology and operational features. With the ABM Treaty now gone as a factor in the Bush administration's plans, ABL is among various technology projects that will get careful attention. But the role of a boost-phase system in a multi-layered system — in particular its interoperability with other layers — is at this point less than obvious.

[38] Sokolsky, p.49.

[39] Frances M. Lussier et.al., *Army Air and Missile Defense: Future Challenges*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002).

[40] If the WMD threat continues to grow as it has over the past decade, the United States and its allies might find it prudent to develop a multi-tiered architecture integrated by a single sensor/battle-management system. Multiple tiers of defence offer seamless target tracking and cuing, each tier focusing on missiles that have evaded detection or destruction by the preceding layer David Gompert and Klaus Arnhold, *Ballistic Missile Defense: A German-American Analysis*, (Santa Monica: RAND/SWP, 2001), p.11.

[41] John D. Steinbruner, *Principles of Global Security*, (Washington DC: Brookings, 2000), pp.82-83.

[42] Ibid., p.83.

[43] Special Report: "Sensors Make-or-Break Ballistic Missile Defense," *Military & Aerospace Electronics*, Vol.12, No.2, 2001, pp.15-20; Postol, "Why Missile Defence Won't Work."

[44] Handberg, p.64.; Reiner K. Huber, "Terrorismus und die Notwendigket einer globalen Rakentenabwehr: Eine Möglichkeit zur Zusammenarbeit mit Russland?" *Politische Studien* Vol.53, March/April, 2002, pp.61-70.

[45] Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, USAF Director, Missile Defense Agency, before the Senate Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee regarding the FY03 Missile Defense Budget, Wednesday, April 17, 2002, p.26.

[46] United States Department of Defense, Prepared Statement on Missile Defense by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, to the Combined Procurement and R&D Subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee, June 27, 2002.

[47] Robert Wall, "New Space-Based Radar Shaped by SBIRS Snags," *Aviation Week & Space Tcelnology*, Vol.156, No.7, 2002, p.30.