

of dealing with security dilemmas other than the traditional, realist self-help approaches. While one may suggest that learning has certainly occurred in the first instance, that in the second, namely, the recognition of security interdependence and the relevant policy changes, has yet to take place.

Chinese approaches to CBMs and transparency demonstrate the extent to which Beijing has embraced the concept of cooperative security. There is no denying that Chinese attitudes to confidence building have shifted from suspicion to guarded endorsement over the past decade. However, as reflecting a *holistic* approach to security and arms control issues, China has maintained that military CBMs only form one (albeit an important one) aspect of overall inter-state relationships. In other words, attempts at military CBMs probably would not go very far if not accompanied by an overall improvement in trust and confidence in political, economic, and social spheres. The usefulness of military CBMs is measured against the political commitment to improve security relationship and consolidate that process. Indeed, according to Chinese analysts, "CBMs themselves do not necessarily involve the reduction of military forces of countries involved, but they have the practical effect of reducing suspicions, relaxing tension, maintaining regional stability, and making it easier to reach agreement on issues of contention."¹⁹

The Chinese therefore would always emphasize that CBMs should be broader in scope and not confined to the military sphere only. Indeed, a more useful way of conducting confidence building is to begin with non-military issues. Once confidence and trust have been established in political, diplomatic, and economic spheres, the process of confidence building then can be introduced to deal with military issues.²⁰ Another characteristic of Chinese approaches is the advocacy for a step-by-step rather than an over-ambitious, all encompassing package-deal method. Trust must be built starting with the relatively easier issues where common interests may already more than outweigh differences. Yet a third is to lay down certain markers for the negotiating counterpart to meet as a test of the other's sincerity in wanting to achieve substantive results.²¹

Chinese views on transparency are that transparency is a relative, rather than absolute, concept. Again, to quote two Chinese analysts

Given its size relative to other powers in Asia, China should have no difficulty being transparent. But, military transparency is not bilateral; rather, it is open to all. Therefore, it will be impossible for China to allow the same degree of transparency -- given China's limited nuclear arsenal --

¹⁹ Liu Huaqiu and Zheng Hua, "Confidence-building Measures in Asia," in Michael Krepon, ed., *Chinese Perspectives on Confidence-building Measures*. Report No. 23 (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 1997), p.1.

²⁰ Si Chu, "Confidence-Building in Asia-Pacific," *Beijing Review* 34:9 (4-10 March 1991), pp.15-16.

²¹ Liu Huaqiu, "Step-By-Step Confidence and Security Building for the Asian Region: A Chinese Perspective," in Ralph A. Cossa, ed., *Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures* (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), pp.119-136; Si Chu, "Confidence-Building in Asia-Pacific," *Beijing Review*, 4-10 March 1991, pp.15-16.