

would result in states falling on a rough line from the lower left to the upper right corner. This suggests that the displacement effect, where development assistance is alleged to free up funds that go directly to military spending, might be difficult to determine on anything but a case-by-case or regional basis. Again, however, there remain several good reasons why development assistance might be usefully considered as a multilateral policy instrument. The analysis in part parallels that given above for external debt.

First, there are several high military spending states that do receive large amounts of development assistance. Using a four percent military expenditure/GNP threshold, and concentrating on those states for whom IDA represents more than five percent of GNP, 13 states would warrant attention: Mauritania, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Rwanda, Laos, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Congo, Angola, Sudan, Mozambique and Oman (the latter two are not shown).<sup>4</sup> Although not all of these were discussed in the case studies, several of those that were did stand out in their specific regional context. A second group of states that are low military spenders but heavily dependent upon IDA could also be examined to see if they represent problem cases within their regions. These could include Guinea-Bissau, Tanzania, Gambia, Malawi, Guyana, Burundi, Zambia, Chad, Nicaragua, Lesotho and Kenya. Several of these scored poorly within their regional context, illustrating once again the importance of this sort of analysis.

On the other hand, the prospects for applying pressure to states such as Zaire, Pakistan or Yemen, none of which are dependent upon development assistance to a significant extent, are relatively slim, at least in the absence of the political will for change on their part. Although the political will to reduce spending may exist in some states in this category (such as Angola), it is unlikely to play a role in many of the other states labelled along the bottom of the graph.

Table 7 on the following page sounds some cautionary notes by providing a statistical snapshot of the possible problems that could be raised by a simple focus on those states that are heavily indebted or dependent upon development assistance. It lists all the states that spend more than five percent of their GNP on defence, and contrasts this with their indebtedness and assistance dependence. What is immediately noteworthy is the number of high military spenders that would be almost completely unaffected by multilateral policies in this area. Libya, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea (and probably Tajikistan, Lithuania and Russia) are all relatively immune with respect to both debt and development assistance influence levers (if one arbitrarily uses a three percent threshold for development assistance and a 50 percent threshold for external debt).

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<sup>4</sup> Four states have also not been shown for scaling reasons. Sierra Leone and Mozambique have levels of military spending and development assistance of 2.2/16.4 percent of GNP, and 7.6/79.2 percent of GNP respectively. Oman receives 9.2 percent of GNP as development assistance, and spends 21.5 percent of GNP on the military. North Korea receives virtually no development assistance (although recent arrangements for food and energy supplies might be significant).