

debates reflected a growing recognition within the Group of 21 that many Third World security problems had their roots in indigenous territorial and irredentist claims rather than in superpower rivalries or hegemonic ambitions.

In the CD, as at UNSSOD II, Third World states held fast to their long-standing inhibitions about bringing regional security problems to the fore in multilateral arms control discussions. Yet, as Edward Luck observed, in the post-UNSSOD II environment of the CD “deep fissures” began to open within the Group of 21 on arms control issues.²⁵ The anti-NPT stalwarts were divided, not only from increasingly moderate neutral and non-aligned members led by Sweden and Egypt (which ratified the NPT in 1980), but among themselves. They no longer formed the core of an anti-superpower, anti-nuclear movement. By 1983 important distinctions could be drawn from the CD plenary debates between the expressed attitudes of India and to a lesser extent Pakistan, on the one hand, and Brazil and Argentina on the other, about the discriminatory nature of the NPT and the superpower near-duopoly of nuclear weapons which the treaty helped to preserve.

None of these threshold states signaled a disposition to change their policy stands on the NPT and disavow the nuclear option. In concert with more moderate members of the Group of 21, however, Brazil and Argentina expressed a limited sympathy for the military logic of Soviet-American system of mutual nuclear deterrence. The chief impulse behind this shift in perception and attitude was not the incipient threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to strategic stability; it was a growing Soviet and American military/technological interest in strategic defences against ballistic missiles and satellite monitoring capabilities. These were areas of civilian and potential military interest to technologically-advanced Third World countries. Thus, by 1986 even Pakistan conceded to the CD that “we are no admirers of the concept of strategic deterrence. We are, however, gravely concerned at the attempts

²⁵ Luck, “A Future for Multilateral Arms Control,” p. 218. See also Michael J. Brenner, “Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Regime: A Multinational Approach,” in Luck ed., *Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative*.