

(TACF) and contributions (well over 95%) to the TACF come from NPT parties. Their collective participation in this preeminent IAEA multi-lateral fund to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is surely an excellent example of NPT parties fulfilling their obligations under Article IV.

Mutually-beneficial bilateral nuclear cooperation is engaged in by many parties to the NPT. But no NPT state is obligated to enter into nuclear cooperation with each and every other state party, nor is it likely to be in a position to do so. Nonetheless, the NPT provides a solid non-proliferation framework to facilitate the development of bilateral cooperation between NPT parties when mutually agreeable.

Canada, as a major exporter of nuclear items, has played and will continue to play a significant role in international nuclear cooperation with a wide variety of countries, both developed and developing. Canada will submit to the conference, as was requested in 1985, a paper on its extensive bilateral nuclear cooperation activities. These include uranium exports, provision of CANDU power and research reactors, nuclear technology transfer and related training and education.

Canada enjoys the full range of nuclear cooperation activities with 28 states through bilateral agreements. All of these states except France, a nuclear-weapon state, are parties to the NPT. Canada makes NPT or equivalent status, as well as full-scope NPT-type safeguards, prerequisites for bilateral nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states.

Canada believes that there is no satisfactory alternative to the NPT-based international non-proliferation regime. For Canada, membership in the NPT or an equivalent binding commitment is a minimum requirement for significant bilateral nuclear cooperation. Receiving the benefits of membership in the NPT club without paying the dues for membership is, for Canada, unacceptable. We are one of the strongest proponents of making NPT adherence and NPT-type safeguards essential conditions of nuclear supply and we shall be so ad-

vocating at this Review Conference. We are encouraged by the number of nuclear supplier states that have indicated support for this policy.

In addition, continuing to clarify the list of materials and equipment that trigger safeguards under Article III and calling on all NPT parties to respect these safeguard obligations would be in direct support of the provisions of Articles III and IV, and the international non-proliferation regime in general.

Some parties to the NPT object to the non-proliferation assurances additional to the NPT often required by suppliers. These requirements, while a matter of national policy, respond to nuclear non-proliferation concerns, including the need to implement fallback safeguards in the event that the IAEA is unable to apply safeguards; to take particular precautions with high enrichment and reprocessing and to have some control over the retransfer of items to third parties. The reasons for bilateral non-proliferation frameworks going beyond, but remaining anchored in, the NPT are more valid than ever.

It is within this more comprehensive non-proliferation regime — buttressed in the NPT but supported by bilateral elements — that Canada believes that assurances of supply, as well as demand, for nuclear commerce can continue to grow and to make contributions to world prosperity. I should add that this potential value does not extend, in our view, to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, as provided for in Article V, which remain in doubt.

One of the fundamental elements of the NPT is the Article VI provision in which parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith towards ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament. The goals envisaged in this Article, despite efforts undertaken, appeared for many years to remain dis-

tant and elusive ones as international tensions provoked the build-up, rather than reduction, of arms.

However, much has changed in the international climate since the last review conference. In the East-West context particularly, the era of suspicion, distrust and tension has been replaced by one of increased cooperation in which states are demonstrating a revitalized commitment to resolve problems by peaceful means. The area of arms control and disarmament is one where this most welcome change is evident.

Since 1985, progress of an unprecedented nature has been made towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. This progress is facilitated by the NPT and represents a significant advance towards fulfilling the Article VI goals. The INF Treaty, concluded in 1987, is now being implemented and represents a noteworthy achievement. Building on the success of the INF Treaty, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have persevered in their negotiations and, at the recent Washington Summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reached agreement in principle on a START Treaty. The signing of this Treaty will result in substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. Both the INF and START treaties require actual cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the signatory states. Their importance in this regard must not be underestimated. Furthermore, these landmark treaties represent precedents upon which additional deep cuts in nuclear arsenals may be negotiated. Canada welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have committed themselves to negotiating a START II Treaty and pursuing a dialogue on enhancing strategic stability after the implementation of START I.

The members of NATO have also called for the opening of new

No Summer Issue

Due to the temporary reassignment of our editor to another project, there was no Summer 1990 issue of *The Disarmament Bulletin*. We hope to resume regular quarterly publication with this, the Fall, issue.