ordinary wheat year, and 1,691,000 acres in 1883. In the former year the area under fall wheat was stated, on the authority of Township assessors, to be (less the area ploughed up or re-sown) 1,188,520 acres; and that under spring wheat, according to the returns of the farmers of the Province to the Bureau on the 15th June last, was 586,817 acres. The figures respecting acreage for 1883 agree very closely with these. The proportions of fall and spring respectively are as below. They show an increase in acreage of spring, and a decrease in that of fall, this year as compared with last:

ACREAGE.

1882.....Fall wheat,	66·97	p. c.
1882.....Spring "	33·03	"
1883.....Fall "	65·41	"
1883.....Spring "	34·59	"

The yield of grain, or rather the estimated yield, shows an altered proportion, however, from the acreage of the respective kinds of wheat above given:

BUSHELS.

1882.....Fall wheat,	76·42	p. c.
1882.....Spring "	23·58	"
1883.....Fall "	62·62	"
1883.....Spring "	37·38	"

Thus there is likely to be this year more spring wheat and less fall than last, owing to the unfavorable weather of the early spring. It is not possible to say exactly what constitutes an average wheat crop in this Province, for, as Mr. Blue says, we have not yet sufficient data to ascertain it accurately. But last year, according to the statistics of the Bureau, it was 23 bushels, and this year it is estimated to be about 16 bushels.

Middlesex appears, this year as well as last, to be the banner county as to product of fall wheat. Her harvest of that grain was last year 2,761,614 bushels; this year it was 1,432,280 bushels. Huron stands second in acreage, though not in product, for Simcoe takes the second place with 1,193,441 bushels. The other leading counties are, in order of acreage this year, Kent, Bruce, Elgin, Perth, York, Oxford, Dufferin. In last year's return, Middlesex, Huron, Simcoe, were first, second and third, respectively, both in acreage and yield of fall wheat. As to yield of spring wheat, the county which took the lead last year was Durham, with 835,700 bushels; but this year the 908,000 bushels of that county, grown on 43,200 acres, is surpassed in quantity, though not in average per acre, by the 1,057,000 bushels grown in Grey on 58,000 acres. Third in order comes Ontario county, then Renfrew, Victoria, Northumberland, Simcoe, York looming up creditably with 499,000 bushels, and Peterboro' with 392,000. The product per acre is, in the case of York county, put down at over twenty bushels, while in no other counties, except Renfrew and Durham, do we find the probable yield stated at so high a figure.

JURISDICTION OVER INSOLVENCY.

While the existing craze continues in legal and constitutional circles, for disputing the respective jurisdiction of the Federal and legislative authorities, the public must be prepared for contest at unexpected points. It is to be hoped, however, that the good sense of the public can be relied upon, to resent all attempts to unnecessarily widen the scope of matters in difference. There is always danger of a contest of this kind being carried to unreasonable lengths. Our interest, if not our patriotism should secure prompt condemnation of all attempts to raise at the peril of serious public detriment, questions of disputed jurisdiction, where there should be no room for reasonable doubt.

It has been suggested more than once that there may be some question, of the right of the Dominion Parliament, to pass a law for the ratable distribution of the assets of insolvent debtors, when such law does not embody provisions for the discharge of such debtors. The discussion of this subject has been revived by publication of the draft of a proposed new measure prepared by the Toronto Board of Trade. The Montreal *Gazette* in a recent issue, refers to the point as one of paramount importance, and suggests the enquiry whether a law can be called a bankrupt law which "does not propose to deal with the bankrupt at all, but provides only for the distribution of the estate of the insolvent debtor, for the benefit of creditors alone, leaving the debtor still a debtor for the balance and un-relieved, by the fact of his property being equitably distributed among all his creditors." The *Gazette*, while inviting discussion of the subject, offers no opinion of its own, but points out the importance of a satisfactory law on the subject existing, which shall be applicable to the whole Dominion. Such a law can emanate only from the Parliament of Canada. The Toronto *Globe* in commenting on the *Gazette's* article, ventures an opinion adverse to the right of the Dominion Parliament to pass such a law; and makes that opinion the occasion for demanding anew, the revision of our constitution. Among other things the *Globe* calls attention to the fact that there is in Quebec, a law by which, when one creditor obtains an execution against the property of a debtor other creditors can obtain a share of the proceeds. Whether this is intended as an argument in favor of the power of other Provinces to deal with the subject, does not clearly appear. If it was so intended, the argument is evidently very wide of the mark, for the law now in force in the Province of Quebec, was in force there before confederation.

To us it appears abundantly clear that the Dominion Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over this subject. True the expression "property and civil rights in the Province" made use of in the British North America Act in conferring exclusive powers upon Provincial Legislatures is sufficiently hazy and indefinite, taken by itself, to mean almost anything. It must however be steadily borne in mind in all these constitutional questions that the intention of that Act was to clothe the central Government with plenary powers, and to raise a presumption in favor of Dominion jurisdiction where any doubt could exist. It follows from this, at the least, that as to the subjects specially relegated to the Dominion Parliament, full effect must be given to the powers which the 91st section assumes to confer expressly upon the Parliament of Canada. A candid investigation of the subject will satisfy every one, we think, that even without invoking the presumption referred to, the exclusive authority of the Dominion Parliament is unquestionable.

The measure proposed by the Toronto Board of Trade, is applicable to traders only, and it might well be argued that its enactment came within the second class of subjects enumerated in section 91, under the heading of "the regulation of trade and commerce." Apart from this, class 21 relegating the subjects of "bankruptcy and insolvency" to the Dominion Parliament, should place the subject beyond all doubt. The jurisdiction has been questioned only because of a misapprehension of the meaning of these terms, occasioned by the fact that in modern times, bankruptcy laws have usually provided, among other things, for the discharge of bankrupts from further liability upon some terms or other. It is, however, a mistake to suppose that such a provision is necessarily a part of a bankruptcy law. The word "bankruptcy" is derived from two Italian words used to designate the *breaking* of the *benches*, tables or counters of money changers who failed in business. The term when first used in English jurisprudence was applied to a department of criminal law. The sole object of the first bankruptcy laws was the prevention of fraudulent traders from escaping their creditors' demands. The inability to meet obligations was in those days regarded as strong evidence of fraud. Our old fashioned ancestors appear to have entertained the notion that men should see their way clear to discharging an obligation before that obligation was incurred. This was the national sentiment, before the times when it was thought proper to encourage trade and commerce, to the extent of inducing citizens to engage in them without qualifications of either capital or experience.

It was long after the enactment of the first bankruptcy laws that the modern feeling of mercy, which has by degrees secured the abolition of imprisonment for debt, insisted upon the law taking some account of the status of debtors, whose assets had been taken from them on account of their inability to meet their obligations.

The word "insolvent" means a person who is unable to pay his debts in full, and insolvency is the condition of such a person. There is nothing in either word that indicates in even the remotest degree an appeal to the exceptional jurisdiction of Parliamentary authority to abrogate contract rights. Practically now-a days the two words bankruptcy and insolvency may be said to mean the same thing, that is, inability to pay one's debts in full. It would seem to be a very clear inference from this that any law is a bankrupt law which proposes to deal with the estate of a person who has become bankrupt or insolvent. How such a law as that now proposed could be said to come within the definition of "property and civil rights" any more than any other conceivable subject may be said to come within such a vague definition, we fail to see. Even in modern times it has always been understood that the main object of every bankruptcy law was to secure "an equitable distribution of the assets of an insolvent person among his creditors." If people would only bear