

sticks had so embarked upon the occupation and business of furnishing pleasure to the members of his family that if some time he permitted one of them to use one of those articles for his personal enjoyment, the latter was engaged in carrying out, not his own purposes, but, as agent, the business of his father."

The Court goes on then to suppose that this theory owes its origin to an automobile being dangerous and an extension of the doctrine of principal is allowable.

We have set out at length the grounds upon which this Court assails the long line of cases sustaining the doctrine, and note the fact it cites no cases taking the view it advocates.

As the Court says, however, it looks like a self-contradictory proposition to say that one engaged in prosecuting his own concerns is agent for another. But does it not also look a little involved, if two members of the family were using the automobile for their pleasure, that both were agents of the owner all of the time they were using it? Did concurrence in purpose have any effect on the question of agency, or must the one driving the automobile be acting solely for the pleasure of the other?

If one acts alone for his own pleasure, this is as the owner intended, just as much as when he acts for the pleasure of another member of the family. What is there inherently contradictory in one acting as the agent for another in acting, not for himself, but in securing something for himself as one of a class?

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