

to stop the qualitative race. With the expected limit on quantities of weapons, system performance becomes much more important. This concern is reflected in statements by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld before the House Armed Services Committee in support of budgetary requests for the fiscal year 1977. Rumsfeld held that the *Minuteman* system was becoming too vulnerable and might have to be replaced. Despite SALT I and possible agreement on the Vladivostok Accord, Rumsfeld left open the possibility of a replacement for *Minuteman* capable of more than tripling the payload. Such a system, along with the *Trident* and B-1 bomber systems proposed earlier, could mean a total ten-year cost for the three programs of some \$65 billion.

### Costs of agreement

In order to evaluate the utility of partial measures such as those reached at SALT, one needs to examine the cost of reaching such agreements. These costs have included the concessions that have been necessary to placate domestic interests, the price paid for "bargaining chips" that have not been cashed, and the suspicion and distrust that have arisen owing to concern over treaty evasions.

Because it has sometimes been more difficult to work out a compromise with various interests within the United States and the Soviet Union than between the two governments, certain agreements have, in fact, accelerated the arms race, with the agreement itself providing minimal compensation. This was true in the case of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Threshold Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty signed in 1974 by the United States and the Soviet Union. In both instances, military interests asked for and received an accelerated nuclear-testing program compatible with the respective treaties.

Similar trade-offs to domestic forces have been apparent at several stages during the SALT talks. According to former *New York Times* reporter Tad Szulc, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were reticent about even supporting the negotiations as such unless the Nixon Administration would support the deployment of MIRV. John Newhouse, in his comprehensive chronicle of the SALT I negotiations entitled "Cold Dawn", has indicated that the acceleration of the *Trident* program was Kissinger's *quid pro quo* to the Joint Chiefs for supporting the Soviet edge in missile capability provided in SALT I. One might assume that similar processes were at work

in the Soviet Union, in view of its extensive arms buildup since 1972.

The political costs to future agreements inherent in efforts to sell the SALT agreements to the U.S. Congress should also not be overlooked. Given the case of Senator Henry Jackson and others, the Administration acquiesced in the so-called Jackson Amendment, which called for equality of arms levels in any future agreements. On the surface, such expectations would appear to be well taken; but in the case of negotiations for strategic arms limitation, the amendment makes negotiation difficult because of the minimum consensus on what constitutes essential equivalence.

It would seem that the SALT agreements have actually worked to the advantage of certain interests involved in weapons-procurement. SALT I especially may have benefited military interests, since it gave the appearance of inequality, allowing those in favour of increased spending to exploit the issue. Since the public is not sophisticated enough to attain the advantages that a state has in a number of other areas to offset such inequalities, it tends to be susceptible to arguments for increasing armaments in areas not limited by treaty.

Certain groups may also have an interest in obtaining agreements limiting favourite weapon systems of other groups. In this manner, the probability of increasing the funding for their own pet projects can be enhanced. Such procedures provide the way for more costly weapon systems which require extensive outlays for research and development. As a result, it can be financially advantageous to change models frequently.

### Bargaining chips

If these arguments for supporting control negotiations are not sufficiently persuasive to influence the military, a conservative, he need only look at yet another advantage provided by such negotiations — they can be, and have been used to justify the production of "bargaining chips", which have usually been used to justify the production of new weapon systems. The production of such chips, however, only creates pressure for the other side to develop its own bargaining chips, and arms races rather than arms reduction are the inevitable outcome.

Despite the futility of the exercise, the history of the SALT talks has been one of continual search for just such a "chip" to enable one side or the other to prevail. The ABM became the first of many such chips, with the Johnson Administration, in its waning days, propo-

*Sometimes  
internal  
compromise  
more difficult  
to achieve*