appears to be final.

When Maximos V was elected (Ecumenical Patriarch in February 1946, he was generally regarded as a strong character who might do something to raise the Patriarchate from its fallen state. It was not long, however, before he had a severe nervous breakdown, and this still continues. The likelihood that Maximos V may soon die or have to be replaced is a matter of some international importance. Soviet Russia, whose policy amounts to resuming the traditional Tsarist rôle of protector of

the Orthodox Christians in the Near East. covets the Œcumenical Patriarchate as an admirable instrument for influencing local opinion. She has failed so far to get a foothold at the Phanar and, though now pursuing the alternative of intriguing for the transfer of its primacy to the Patriarchate of Moscow, she would doubtless be glad to obtain the election of a Russian nominee. The Western Powers have no interest in such an increase of Soviet influence at Istanbul. To Greece any such development would be doubly objectionable, since it would help to postpone to a remote future the realisation of the now dormant "Great Idea " of a Greek Constantinople. Turkey, the sovereign Power, has little to fear from Greece in present conditions of Turco-Greek interdependence and friendship, but it is vital for her to prevent the Patriarchate from passing under Soviet influence. Her interest is therefore that the Patriarchate should not be so feeble as to invite Soviet intervention, nor so strong as to be again the champion of Greek nationalism. The Orthodox in Turkey and abroad can but desire to see some measure of strength restored to an institution whose authority recently extended from the Adriatic to the Caucasus, but, since the expulsion of the Greeks in 1922, has been confined to the remnant in Istanbul. Shorn of properties, revenues and the offerings of most of the faithful, the Œcumenical Patriarchate to-day presides over a depressed little community of some 80,000 souls who can hardly provide a quorum of bishops for the Holy Synod nor candidates for bishoprics when they fall vacant. Moreover, in the administration of its churches, schools, hospitals and other institutions the Greek community of Istanbul is still exposed to arbitrary and vexatious interference by the Turkish authorities.

## THE MIDDLE EAST

Egypt

Nokrashy Pasha has deliberately delayed the presentation of the Egyptian case to the Security Council of the United Nations in the hope of strengthening his position in the country before doing so, and, possibly, with some hope also that last-minute concessions by His Majesty's Government might do away with the necessity to refer to the United Nations at all. But there are now signs that the matter can be put off no longer, and the Ahram talks of the middle of May as a probable date for the case to be brought up, giving as reasons for the delay the need to await the conclusion

of the Moscow Conference and the undesirability of overlapping with the discussions on the Palestine problem. The press appear to think that the Egyptian delegation will argue that the 1936 Treaty is invalid because it includes clauses "contrary to the Charter of the United Nations," as al Misri puts it. The writer of this article argues that Great Britain alone has no right to assume responsibility for the protection of the Suez Canal, which should be assured by the Security Council. Nokrashy Pasha, in a conversation with the correspondent of The Times, has taken much the same line. He held that there is

no justification for the retention of British forces on Egyptian territory, and said that evacuation to the Canal Zone did not satisfy his views on the matter. The Assembly of the United Nations, he said, had pronounced against the retention of the troops of one country on the territory of another without that other's agreement, and the Egyptians, seeing no present or early threat, and regarding the 1936 Treaty as having been designed to meet circumstances which no longer exist, did not now agree to the presence of British troops. He suggested that reference to the Security Council could be obviated if His Majesty's Government, "as an act of policy, based on an examination of what was right and just, independent of political and strategic objections," were to withdraw their troops from Egypt forthwith. He was insistent that such a decision must not have the appearance of a concession wrung by Egypt from His Majesty's Government. His Majesty's Ambassador interprets Nokrashy's insistence on this point as due in part, at any rate, to his feeling that such a decision would amount to His Majesty's Government dropping the claim that the 1936 Treaty is still in force, which would remove the necessity for Egypt to go to the United Nations to argue its invalidity. It is not clear what Nokrashy would hope to gain in the question of the Sudan. He says that, if he could announce that British troops would be out of Egypt by the spring of 1948, Egypt's aspirations would be satisfied and a new treaty could be concluded in three months. He refused to commit himself on the terms of a treaty, and said it was impossible to say in advance what the treatment of the Sudan question would be.

Although Nokrashy Pasha, in the interview quoted above, referred only to the removal of British troops from Egypt, the Cairo press assures its readers that immediate and complete evacuation of all foreign troops from Egypt and the Sudan will be demanded before the Security Council. The Egyptian Government will thus presumably claim the invalidity not only of the 1936 Treaty, but of the 1899 Agreement by which the condominium in the Sudan was established; or, alternatively, that Egypt has sovereign rights over the Sudan and that she is entitled to demand the removal of foreign troops from that country as well as from Egypt.

## Palestine

The imminence of the discussions on Palestine before the Asssembly of the 33552

United Nations has not produced a more helpful attitude from the Jewish Agency. After the attack on the Cairo train on the 22nd April the High Commissioner sent for Mr. Ben Gurion, the Chairman of the Agency Executive, and warned him in the gravest possible terms of the inevitable results of a continuance of acts of violence, e.g., tightening of military control and the liquidation of much, if not all, of what the Jews had built up. But Ben Gurion, although he reaffirmed his desire to stamp out terrorism, gave no hope of co-operation with the security forces. His Excellency's reference to the illogicality of taking up this attitude while the matter is sub judice at the United Nations Assembly merely produced the argument that the matter was not sub judice, and that His Majesty's Government were still bound to interpret the Mandate as the Jews read it. However, in spite of unwillingness to co-operate actively with the authorities, the Jewish Agency have announced in the press a new drive against terrorism, which will be directed principally to "systematic education" in the youth movements, which are recognised as the factories of anti-British sentiment and terrorism.

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On the 25th April a Post Office vehicle was stolen in Tel Aviv and two hours later was driven up to Sarona camp by two men pretending to be workmen of the Posts and Telegraph Department. Their passes were apparently in order, and nothing suspicious was found in the vehicle although it was searched. The men left the vehicle near the Depot Headquarters, where it afterwards exploded causing the death of a British Inspector and three British constables, and injuries to ten others, British, Arab and Jewish.

Assistant-Superintendent of Police Conquest was murdered in a Haifa street by two Jewish youths about noon on the 27th April.

A 300-ton steamer registered at Istanbul was intercepted on the 21st April and boarded when she entered territorial waters on the 23rd April. Some opposition was offered, but the 773 illegal immigrants were got off and the majority were immediately trans-shipped to Cyprus. No master or crew were found on board.

The hunger-strike at the Cyprus camps (see last week's Summary) was called off after lasting for ninety hours.

Apart from the communiqué issued after the recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab States at Damascus (see under "Arab League" in last week's Summary) there is little indication of the tactics

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