

Nolting went so far as to suggest that the GRVN might even be persuaded to withdraw its formal note to the Commission, assuming it had been delivered. On the other hand, we both, I think, recognized that there might be something to be said for keeping further relations with the GRVN on this question in the formal realm of specific written communications, in preference to public demonstrations and covert pressure.

4. In my view Johnson's attitude, as indicated above, coincided with the Canadian position, as expressed in your telegram. He went even further on his own accord to say that if the State Department at any time came to the conclusion that the International Commission in Vietnam on balance no repeat no longer served a useful purpose, they would consult with Canadian authorities before any action was taken in consequence. On the other hand Johnson did make plain, apropos of the extent to which the GRVN could be influenced by USA, that the attitude of the Indian Delegation had not repeat not helped matters. For example when a deputation of South Vietnam officials had come to register a protest in connection with Nam's death, Naravane had treated them cavalierly and told them that if they had any protest to make to leave it in the box by the gate as they left. Johnson said there could be no repeat no doubt the death of Nam had very much upset the South Vietnam and this attitude on the part of Naravane did nothing to assuage their feelings.

5. Johnson went on to describe at some length the general internal situation in Vietnam. He said that it was deteriorating "quite alarmingly," especially on the military side. He summed up the implications of this by saying that somehow, if the situation were not repeat not to be lost, a "quantitative" change in the military balance was necessary. What was now being done was in his view not repeat not enough. Substantially new support was needed to reverse the trend. However, he specifically added that he was not repeat not suggesting that the introduction of USA combat troops would provide the answer. He said that General Taylor had not repeat not yet formulated any recommendations as to what might be done but he, Johnson, would be surprised if the general made any recommendation favouring the employment of Western forces. For the moment he simply wanted to share with us his "serious concern" over the situation and to note that "difficult decisions" might have to be taken.

[A.D.P.] HEENEY

758.

DEA/50052-A-13-40

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in United States
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 3514

Washington, November 17, 1961

SECRET. CANADIAN EYES ONLY. OPIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Our Tel 3498 Nov 16.†

SOUTH VIETNAM (POSSIBLE USA MEASURES)

In recent telegrams (particularly our 3474 Nov 11† and 3498 Nov [16] and other messages) we have reported fully on USA "thinking" on the situation in South Vietnam, and the measures they have in contemplation following the return of General Taylor.⁴⁵ The British and French missions here have both been officially informed along the same lines of the consideration

⁴⁵ Voir/See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, Vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Bureau, 1988), Part IX.