

facilities with alacrity (Documents 697 and 699). This arrangement quickly proved unsatisfactory; it met neither Washington's need for unfettered access to its bases in Canada nor Ottawa's wish to be consulted about such consequential use of its territory. As the year ended, the two countries continued — and they would do so until the mid-1960s — to wrestle with this dilemma.

The importance of defence questions in Canadian foreign policy in 1951 accounts for the attention this volume accords Canada's activities in the North Atlantic alliance. Throughout the year, the process of reorganization that was started in 1950 gathered speed. NATO's decision in late 1950 to station an integrated force in Europe created a host of legal and organizational problems for the alliance (Documents 414 to 453), not least among them the perennial question of who paid for what (documents 436 to 440). In the same vein, this volume devotes some space to the procedural problems that the re-organized North Atlantic Council (Document 435) addressed as it tried to determine exactly what inter-allied consultation meant (Documents 429 to 434). In addition to tracing Canada's response to these kinds of alliance-wide concerns, the volume also documents the political, financial and legal considerations that arose from Canada's decision to despatch the 27th Infantry Brigade Group to Germany (Documents 393 to 428).

More important, the chapter on North Atlantic affairs examines the evolution of Canadian defence and mutual aid policy as the North Atlantic Council urged its members to step up their efforts to close the gap between the alliance's resources and its military requirements (Documents 352 to 392). Not surprisingly, the arduous rearmament campaign prompted some member states to revisit the purposes and meaning of the alliance. The United States suggested that the North Atlantic Council investigate how the allies could achieve the kind of non-military cooperation envisaged in the treaty's second article. The American initiative provided an opportunity for Canadian officials to debate the merits of closer North Atlantic cooperation in an exchange of letters and memoranda which were, for the most part, sceptical of Article II's value (Documents 477 to 484). Their suspicions were not misplaced. At the same time as the council asked Pearson to chair a committee to study closer inter-allied economic and political cooperation (Documents 476 and 485 to 491), it established a new mechanism to coordinate alliance activities. Composed of Britain, France and the United States, the new Temporary Council Committee acted as a kind of 'star chamber' which assessed each member's contribution to the alliance (Documents 492 to 504). This experiment in co-ordinating economic and military resources was hardly popular in Ottawa.

Cold War considerations influenced almost every aspect of Canadian external relations in 1951. For instance, despite the fiscal restraint program imposed as a result of the war in Korea, new posts were opened in Portugal — to consolidate relations with a NATO ally (Documents 12 to 14) — and in Finland — to strengthen the Baltic republic's fragile independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (Documents 7 to 11). Similarly, a peace treaty with Japan was concluded (Documents 950 to 968), and the postwar settlement with Italy revised (Documents 897 to 902), in a manner designed to please these new Cold War allies. Old friendships assumed new significance in the tense bipolar context, as the documents on the sale of Canadian wheat to Norway attest (Documents 903 to 908).