

effect, as Admiral Holmes wrote after the battle, that a plan to land four leagues above the town was afoot. Wolfe as usual kept his own counsel: he did not, it is generally agreed, say a word to his Brigadiers as to the decision he had taken; they seem to have learned no more than was contained in the General Orders issued on the 11th—orders which went into detail on every point except as to the spot at which the attack was to be made. Nor was it even mentioned in further orders on the 12th.<sup>1</sup> "The troops will land where the French seem least to expect it. The first body that gets on shore is to march directly to the enemy and drive them from any little post they may occupy. The battalions must form on the upper ground and be ready to charge whatever presents itself. The officers and men will remember what their country expects of them." The Brigadiers were only less in the dark than the French themselves. Late on the 12th all three wrote to ask Wolfe to give them more explicit instructions for the operations which were to take place in a few hours' time. "We must beg leave to request of you as distinct Orders as the nature of the thing will admit of, particularly of the place or places we are to attack. This circumstance (perhaps very decisive) we cannot learn from the public orders, neither may it be in the power of the naval officer who leads the Troops to instruct us."

Wolfe and  
his  
brigadiers.

And these were the Brigadiers whose plan Wolfe is supposed to have adopted: this was the plan whose "unexpected and surprising character," Warburton and Townshend said, was the Brigadiers' and not Wolfe's; this was "the daring and skilful proposition"

<sup>1</sup> Wood, p. 221.