

*External Affairs*

reported as the accomplishments of the red government in China after a visit of some two weeks there, seeing, I suppose, what the Chinese government wanted him to see.

But in the course of telling about these things and painting that very glowing picture of what red China had accomplished in the social and economic fields and at the same time condemning Chiang Kai-shek for brutality, my hon. friend said nothing whatever about the millions of their own flesh and blood whom the communist regime in China have liquidated since they took over in 1949. Not a single word did he say. He made no mention at all about the brutal treatment of American and British prisoners of war in China. He said nothing about the brain washing and the forced admissions by torture of things that were false from prisoners of war in that country. That, of course, I suppose is honest government.

My hon. friend did not say anything either about the aggressions of the red Chinese, the aggression in South Korea, and after the years of killing, massacre and aggression in that area the refusal of red China to countenance free elections in Korea and try to bring about by honest effort the unity of that country under a government of their own. I suppose that is honest government. He said nothing whatsoever about Chinese induced and supplied aggressions in Indo-China and the terrific suffering of many hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of people in that land as a consequence. Nor did he say anything about the recent threats of the red regime to conquer Formosa, to take it by force. I suppose all of these things are to be overlooked.

I do not for one moment condone any brutal misdeeds of Chiang Kai-shek and the members of his government, but the fact that they may have committed such brutal misdeeds does not for one second excuse the red regime for committing hundreds of times as many even if they have made some progress in social and economic fields. In the course of his address this afternoon the hon. member failed utterly to distinguish between Chiang Kai-shek, on the one hand, and the strategic importance of Formosa in this very difficult time, on the other—not for one moment. That is exactly the kind of confusion that the communists of the world are trying to spread. That is what they want the people of the world to believe, that the two are one and that when you condemn Chiang Kai-shek you have to condemn Formosa and its possession for the time being by forces other than those of red China.

[Mr. Low.]

My hon. friend did not mention the fact either that from the best information available the Formosans themselves are in mortal fear of being "liberated" by red China, mortal fear of the kind of liberation they could expect from the mainland. The best information we can possibly get, the most reliable, is that they are free people and are determined to remain free. It is because of the fact that the hon. member failed to mention these things but painted the other picture of a black and brutal Chiang Kai-shek that I say his speech will be interpreted as giving comfort to the communists who are trying their level best to win the battle of men's minds by deluding them, leading them to believe a lie.

It seems that these days most of the discussion of international affairs centres around the policies of the United States. I suppose one could expect that this would be inevitable because of the position of leadership occupied by the United States in the world today, but I think that is reassuring when we review the changes that have taken place, especially in United States Far Eastern policy, since those bleak days of surrender to Russia and communism in the latter part of the Roosevelt and the first part of the Truman administrations. The world will be a long time recovering from the blunders and appeasements of those days, if it ever recovers.

On December 23, 1949, Mr. Acheson, secretary of state in President Truman's cabinet, sent to all overseas state department officials a secret memorandum that read as follows:

American criticism of American policy over Formosa has come largely because of a mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to the United States defence in the Pacific. The loss of the island is widely anticipated, and the manner in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the nationalists adds weight to the expectation. All available material should be used to counter false impressions that the retention of Formosa would save the Chinese nationalist government, or that its loss would seriously damage American interests. Formosa has no special military significance.

That seemed to be the official American attitude in 1949, and anyone who takes the trouble to examine the implications of the whole statement will recognize in it the same ideas that the communist imperialists skillfully attempt to use to delude the American people today, and other free peoples of the world. Communists and their sympathizers are still trying to mislead the peoples of the free world with these ideas, and their purpose is to make it possible for red China to take Formosa and thus to cut the Pacific defence line.