

## **Nuclear CSBMs: Connections and Priorities**

The goal of confidence and security building measures, developed to advance the disarmament agenda in order to safeguard the NPT and the regimes built around it, must be the delegitimation of nuclear weapons as instruments of security for those who retain them. Judged by this standard, the two most important of the measures surveyed in this report are the changes to the NATO Strategic Concept and the de-alerting/de-mating of the NWSs strategic nuclear arms.

- The NATO Strategic Concept must be revised to remove the centrality of nuclear weapons. While NATO operationally considers nuclear weapons essential to providing security against any form of attack, it is in no position to suggest that such weapons are not equally important to others.
- The de-alerting of strategic nuclear weapons, particularly the de-mating warheads from delivery systems, draws these weapons as far from the routine security policy of the NWSs as is possible, without disarmament.

These two measures can usefully be supported by a number of the others surveyed above:

- Legally-binding negative security assurances and no-first-use declarations would render nuclear war illegal in all circumstances (while not rendering all use of nuclear weapons illegal). Such binding declarations would, therefore, provide an important normative context for de-alerted strategic weapons.
- The removal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployment is in keeping with the logic of de-alerting, and so should be adopted in parallel to the de-alerting of strategic weapons. Such a removal of non-strategic weapons from deployment is also intimately tied to the changes in NATO's Strategic Concept, because the presence of US tactical nuclear forces in Europe is presently considered to be essential to maintaining the transatlantic link. Were the Strategic Concept amended to remove the centrality of nuclear weapons from NATO's security policy, it would require the return of US tactical weapons to the United States.
- Nuclear arms reductions are a necessary element of any programme of nuclear disarmament. Therefore, further negotiated reductions in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals would be welcome. Because of the importance of the inequity of the NPT to the opposition to the Treaty, it is also important that the other three NWSs join these discussions in order to demonstrate their good faith. In an attempt both to link these discussions explicitly to Article VI, and to provide a way to avoid tacitly recognising India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states, these discussions should be held within the context of the NPT Prepcom/Review Process.

These measures are mutually supporting, and would form an important advance in the delegitimation of nuclear weapons on the road to nuclear disarmament.