

verification regime for the BTWC within the Group of Experts has already raised issues associated with whether it is possible to achieve effective verification. An agreed-upon definition of military significance when applied to biological weapons will be no easier to achieve than it is for chemical weapons. Pharmaceutical industry representatives will undoubtedly have concerns over the potential loss of their proprietary information similar to those of the chemical manufacturers. Bureaucratic structures for global regimes will be cumbersome and costly; in a period of defence budget cuts, questions will be raised about whether they are worth the expense. While these and other issues should be considered in formulating and negotiating future multilateral verification regimes, the problems associated with implementing these regimes will overshadow the highly visible negotiations, and they will affect the future of the whole arms control process either positively or negatively.

In addition to the formal verification regime associated with the CWC and information available from NIM, future CBMs could offer the potential for making a significant contribution to effective verification. For example, implementation of a global Open Skies agreement would provide both transparency and useful data on chemical weapons manufacturing facilities. There could also be established a pooled data system in which members of an international association of chemical manufacturers could exchange information and experiences associated with implementation of the CWC. While this should enhance verification, such exchanges could result in potential cheaters acquiring information which would facilitate their ability to violate the agreement.

*Regional agreements*, like multilateral agreements, are likely to take on increased importance because they can contribute to stability in several hot spots of the world, such as the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Although the Rush Bagot Agreement of 1817 was one of the first modern regional agreements, a more useful example is the Latin American

Nuclear Free Zone Treaty signed in 1967. This treaty, commonly known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, obligates Latin American countries not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, nor to permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. It appears that all Latin American countries, including Cuba, will ratify this agreement.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco establishes an organization to help ensure compliance with treaty provisions, the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), with a General Conference, a Council and a Secretariat as its permanent organs. A "control system" is used to verify treaty provisions. The system requires that each party negotiate an agreement with the IAEA for the application of IAEA safeguards to the party's nuclear activities. The control system also requires a series of reports and provides for special inspections; both measures are designed to assist in verifying compliance with the treaty.

In order to assure compliance with the treaty, each party will supplement these formal procedures with its NIM. CBMs can also contribute to regional arms control agreements. For example, under an agreement signed in December 1991, Brazil and Argentina have also put all their nuclear sites under the full international safeguards of the IAEA; this bilateral accord creates a joint agency for sharing information, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accountability and Control of Nuclear Materials. The CBMs originally included in the Contadora Treaty also encourage openness in the region.

The Tlatelolco Treaty and the CBMs cited above could serve as examples for other regional agreements. In more troubled areas of the globe, however, parties to an agreement establishing a nuclear-free zone might need the assurance associated with a strengthened IAEA inspection regime, including the implementation of authorized challenge inspections.

*Reciprocal actions* are also gaining in importance in contributing to stability and providing a foundation for formal arms control agreements.

