

includes Soviet territory west of the Ural Mountains, means that Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe would have to be withdrawn to the Urals. The geographical problem is thereby modified but not resolved.

During planning for the MBFR talks there was little explicit reference to the geographical factor. Western insistence on asymmetrical reductions was related to the problem of geographical disparity, but the objective of equal ceilings meant that there would ultimately be no compensation for the West's geographical disadvantage.<sup>44</sup>

Recognition of the geographical factor can therefore be found mainly in references to reductions being "balanced" in "scope and timing". The 1970 Rome Declaration was more specific in stating that reductions "should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side having regard for the differences arising from geographical and other considerations."<sup>45</sup>

By contrast, pronouncements in the period leading up to the new negotiations have highlighted the geostrategic asymmetry. The Brussels Declaration underlined the importance of "considerations of geography."<sup>46</sup> This was spelled out at the NATO Summit in 1988:

"The countries of the Warsaw Pact form a contiguous land mass; those of the Alliance are geographically disconnected;

The Warsaw Pact can generate a massive reinforcement potential from distances of only a few hundred kilometres; many Allied reinforcements need to cross the Atlantic."<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> See Ernest F. Jung, "Conventional Arms Control in Europe in Light of the MBFR Experience," *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 1988, 156-157.

<sup>45</sup> Declaration on MBFR at NATO Ministerial Meeting, Rome, May 1970, paragraph 3.

<sup>46</sup> Brussels Declaration, paragraph 6.

<sup>47</sup> "Conventional Arms Control: The Way Ahead," 2 March 1988, paragraph 1.