

*Cavalry.*

Peterboro' Camp....Northumberland and Durham Squadron.  
 Kingston Camp.....Frontenac Troop.  
 Napanee Camp.....Napanee Troop.  
 Picton Town.....Picton Troop.

*Artillery.*

Kingston Artillery Park Kingston Field Battery.  
 Cobourg Drill Shed .....Cobourg Garrison Battery.  
 Napanee Camp.....Napanee Garrison Battery.

*Infantry.*

Kingston Camp.....14th P. W. O. Rifles.  
 Bellevue Camp.....15th Argyle Lt. Infantry.  
 Peterboro' Camp.....40th Battalion Infantry.  
 do .....45th do  
 do .....46th do  
 Kingston Camp.....47th do  
 Napanee Camp.....48th do  
 Bellevue Camp.....49th do  
 Peterboro' Camp.....57th do

By reason of the change in the orders for the carrying out the annual drill this year, and making it optional with corps to perform eight days' drill under canvas, or sixteen days' drill at their respective headquarters "as might be most convenient," the instructions contained in the G. O., 30th May, 1873, that forty rounds a man should be expended at target practice during the 16 days, could not be carried out in the eight days, which latter nearly all the corps selected as the most convenient, having hereby a shorter time to serve, and double pay in proportion. The G. O., 30th May, gave six days out of the sixteen to rifle instruction and target practice, and ten other days to company and battalion drill, thus accounting for every one of the sixteen days. The corps which assembled for eight days only, in camps, gave up one day for coming and one day for going home, and had only six days left for every other exercise. And as the G. O., 23rd June did not curtail the number of rounds to be fired, but rather insisted upon the instructions of G. O., 30th May, as to the drill and exercises being carried out in conformity with that order, the commanding officers were manifestly unable to comply with both orders, and were obliged to choose between drill exercises and rifle exercises, some chose one and some the other, while a few combined the two, and fired ten or any number of rounds as they could spare time. I have therefore not included in my tabular returns any particulars of target practice, as it is impossible to find a correct figure of merit from such varied and uncertain data. I propose at the conclusion of the year (30th June, 1874) to call upon all commanding officers for an account of the ammunition they have received for this year's consumption, with the details of the target practice,

This may not prove a satisfactory or reliable method of finding the best shot and the highest figure of merit, as without proper supervision by disinterested parties appointed for the purpose, the returns may not be altogether correct, but as the firing of 40 rounds a man has been made the standard on which to judge these points throughout the country, I see no other way at present of arriving at a correct decision.

I regret to report the death, on the 20th September last, of Lieut. Colonel Herchmer

Hamilton, lately in command of the 47th Frontenac Battalion. His death occurred during the time the 47th Battalion was in camp, at Kingston. His loss will be felt by the County of Frontenac, and by the Militia Service of the Dominion.

The large camp formed in the vicinity of Peterborough, on the banks of the river Otonabee, composed of certain Corps of the 6th Brigade Division, under the command of Lieut. Col. D'Arcy Boulton, of the Northumberland and Durham Cavalry, as senior officer, was very successful.

Camp equipage was issued to every Corps applying for it to go into camp, and the Corps composing the Peterboro' Camp caused all the equipage intended for them to be deliberated at Cobourg or Port Hope, whence it was conveyed at their own expense, by private arrangement with transport companies, to the camping ground. All this equipage has not yet been returned to store and it has been reported that some few tents and a considerable number of blankets are deficient. Although I directed that the Camp equipment for each Corps should be distinctly addressed to the several Commanding Officers, and the Bills of Lading should be made out for their signatures on delivery I fear the directions were not observed in such a manner as to fasten the losses upon particular individuals.

(To be continued.)

## ELECTRIC TORPEDOES.

Mr. N. J. Holmes recently read before a English society, papers "On Electric Torpedoes." He first spoke of them as a means of defence in naval and military warfare in general, and next as applied to service on land in particular. The author held that no civilized Government could ignore the importance of torpedoes in modern warfare. They ought to render attacks with rifled guns and armor-plated vessels futile. There was a case in point dating back as far as December, 1865. In the report of the Secretary of the United States Navy the following passage occurs:—"When the United States fleet attacked and passed the forts erected for the sea defence of Mobile and Wilmington, mounting together nearly 600 guns, many rifled, and of the heaviest calibre the only vessels lost by the United States Government in both these attacks—and the shore batteries of the Confederates splendidly served—were destroyed by electric torpedoes, which always formidable in harbors and internal waters, have proved more destructive to our naval vessels than all other means combined." This was at a time when the torpedo system was only in its infancy, and manipulated by the Confederate engineers under very possible disadvantage. Simple in its construction and action, called upon to expend its power upon the enemy without reciprocal challenge, the most powerful monitor or armor-plated ship ever constructed easily falls a prey to its deadly embrace. At the cost of a few thousand pounds the strongest ship with its heavy guns and gallant crew, fitted out at a cost of hundreds of thousands of pounds, becomes comparatively inoperative for the attack. Half a dozen men in control of the torpedo mines can effectually keep at bay both an army and a fleet, and at will, should either encroach within range of their "area of destruction," annihilate in a few seconds the advancing foe, who if not totally destroyed, will be at least fatally crippled.

Another illustration from the American Civil War of the effective power of a well

planned torpedo mine will serve to demonstrate the value of this agent. The important defence of the water approach to Richmond was instructed to a single electric torpedo mine sunk in the channel-way of James river. This mine, of considerable power, was under the control of an officer, who stationed on one of the river banks, watched from the sandpit where he concealed the approach of the enemy. A single stake planted upon the opposite bank served to indicate—by the passing vessel being in a line with his station and the stake—the exact moment when she would be within the area of destruction. With the patience of a spider watching for its victim, so for thirteen months did this officer remain waiting for the opportunity to explode the mine with effect. At length the Federal fleet, under command of Commodore Lee, entered the James river, the Commodore's vessel being the third in the advancing rank. The foremost vessel, carrying seven guns, and manned with a pick crew of 127 men, was allowed to pass over the mine in safety, it being by arrangement held in reserve for the Commodore's ship: when the order having been passed from the deck of the next vessel, and audible on the shore, for her to fall back and drag for torpedo wires, the officer determined to explode his mine and "hoist" her as she descended the stream. The explosion took place upon a clear afternoon, and was witnessed by several persons. The hull of the vessel was visibly lifted out of the water, her boilers exploded, the smoke-stacks carried away, and the crew projected into the air with great velocity; out of the 127 men only three escaped alive. The vessel was literally blown to atoms, or, using the American phrase, into "toothpicks." The awfully sudden and unexpected destruction of this vessel paralysed the operations of the Federal fleet for a time, and Richmond was saved. Commodore Lee, declining to advance, sunk several of his ships, blocking up the channel-way. This obstruction afterwards, on the advance of General Butler, gave rise to the cutting of the "Duch Gap" Canal, now a matter of history.

(To be continued.)

The Council of the Royal United Service Institution having decided that a gold medal be granted annually for the best essay on a naval or military subject, to be determined on, each year, by the council, have made known the conditions of competition:—The candidates must be officers on full pay or half pay. The essays shall be on matters connected with the Army and Navy, alternately, commencing this year with a military subject. They must not exceed thirty two pages of the size and style of the "Journal." They must be forwarded to the secretary, on or before the 1st December in each year. They must be strictly anonymous, but each have a motto, and be accompanied by a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside, and the name of the candidate inside. They will be submitted for decision to three referees chosen by the council. The successful candidate will be presented with the medal at the anniversary meeting, and his essay will be printed in the *Journal*. The subject for the succeeding year will be announced at each anniversary meeting. The following is the subject for the essay to be rendered on or before the 1st December, 1874—On the best mode of providing recruits, and forming Reserves, for the British Army; taking into consideration its various duties in peace and war.