

sey, Toronto township. Peter Mallaby, Weston, took first prize with a very nice one-horse market waggon. This finished our tour of the fair grounds; and judging from the steady increase which has been manifested in the number of entries since the first exhibition was held in Toronto in 1816, we shall be able to look forward to a much larger and better testimony to the advance of our new Dominion in art, agriculture, science, and mechanics, by the time the next Provincial Fair is held in Toronto.

THE ENGLISH MERCANTILE NAVY.

Going back as far as 1818, the aggregate tonnage of the English mercantile navy amounted at that date to 5,900,001 tons against 1,956,591 tons belonging to the United States, or an excess to about one-third, and about four times as large as the tonnage of France, which was 679,863 tons. Gradually, however, these proportions changed until at the breaking out of the American civil war, in 1861, when England owned 5,895,369 tons, the United States 5,482,027 tons, and France 983,996. From that period the mercantile navy of the United Kingdom rapidly developed, until 1872, the last date included in the return, the aggregate of British tonnage was 7,213,829, against 4,381,957 belonging to the United States, or an excess of about two-thirds, and nearly seven times as large as the tonnage of France, which was only 1,077,611. From this it follows that the commercial navy of Great Britain has increased more quickly than that belonging to the two other chief maritime powers, and that the principal part of this increase has taken place lately. For 20 years after the battle of Waterloo there was not any appreciable development of the British mercantile marine, the tonnage in 1841 was 2,691,276 against 2,883,791 in 1835, being a difference of only about 100,000 tons, or at the rate of 5,000 tons per annum. After the expiration of another 20 years, the aggregate had risen in 1855 to 5,250,553, being an increase of 2,556,792 tons, or at the rate of nearly 130,000 tons per annum. During the subsequent 17 years included in the tables the increase of tonnage has been 1,963,276 averaging 115,000 tons per annum. As might be expected, the greatest development took place in the years immediately succeeding the outbreak of the American civil war, when a considerable of the ocean-carrying trade performed by the United States fell into the hands of England. Between 1861 and 1865, when the war terminated, the aggregate tonnage of Great Britain rose from 5,895,369 to 7,322,604, the highest point ever reached, being an increase of 1,427,235 in four years, or at the rate of 355,000 tons per annum. During the same period, American tonnage exclusively registered for Ocean traffic fell from 2,642,628 to 1,702,583, or a decrease of more than a million tons, being at the rate of 250,000 per annum. Since 1865 there has been an insignificant falling off in the tonnage belonging to both nations, while that of France has slightly increased. More detailed particulars are given in another table, setting forth "the tonnage of shipping entered and cleared in the United Kingdom, United States, France, Holland, Norway, Prussia, and Sweden, distinguishing between national and foreign ships, from 1850 to 1872, both in cargo and in ballast." In the first-named year England employed 65.1 per cent. of indigenous tonnage, and 34.9 per cent. of foreign, but in 1872 the proportion of the former rose to 67.6, while the latter fell to 32.4. The contrary occurred in the case of the United States. In 1850 they cleared 59.8 national tonnage against 40.2 foreign, but in 1872 the former had decreased to 34.3 per cent., and the latter increased to 65.7 per cent. A similar transfer of the carrying trade to foreign bottoms is seen in the case of France. Her proportion of national tonnage cleared has fallen from 41 to 34.2 per cent., while foreign has increased from 59 to 65.8 per cent. Holland follows suit, indigenous tonnage have contracted from 41.8 to 25.8 per cent. Norway, Prussia, and Sweden also each display some decrease in the amount of national, and increase in that of foreign tonnage cleared from their ports, but the difference is only slight. Taking a comprehensive view of the seven nations included in the return, England is found to be the only country employing a greater percentage of national tonnage, and smaller of foreign than was the case 22 years ago. Nor do the figures giving the total tonnage of all sorts, home and foreign, cleared by seven nations afford less satisfactory proofs of British prosperity. That of England has increased from 14,505,064 in 1850 to 22,501,025, or, roughly speaking, by 200 per cent. The United States has risen from 8,709,641 to 21,540,157 tons during the same period, being

an increase of 150 per cent.; France from 4,610,719 to 14,597,788 tons, or 220 per cent.; Holland from 2,236,435 to 5,677,038 tons, or 150 per cent.; Norway from 1,396,945 to 3,231,986 tons, or 130 per cent.; Prussia from 2,090,358 to 8,516,574 tons, or 300 per cent.; and Sweden from 1,066,886 to 2,791,893, or 170 per cent. Taking the aggregate amount of tonnage employed by these seven nations at the two epochs, Great Britain cleared 42 per cent. of the whole in 1850, and 43 per cent. in 1872.—*Exchange.*

CANADIAN MANUFACTURERS AND RECIPROCITY.

The manufacturers of the Dominion of Canada have been holding a convention to discuss the subject of reciprocity, and have, with great unanimity, expressed their hostility to the proposed treaty. In this there is nothing surprising or unexpected. The manufacturers of Canada have latterly been clamouring for protection against the United States, just as the manufacturers of the United States are always clamouring for protection against the world in general, and Canada and England in particular. They are not so extravagant in their demands, indeed, because there are fewer Morrills and Kelleys in the Dominion Parliament than in our Congress, and because the Canadians will not submit so quietly as our people do to the operation of fleecing in the name of home industry. But they are as ready as our manufacturers to offer resistance to any progress in the direction of commercial freedom.

The action of this Canadian convention brings to light the curious fact that the manufacturers on both sides of the line are opposed to the treaty. The manufacturer on this side are afraid that with free commerce the Canadians will crush out their infant industries, and the manufacturers of the other side are equally afraid that we will crush out their infant industries.

Now it is obvious that there cannot be good ground for fear on both sides, and as both sides are about equally afraid, it is presumable that they are tolerably well matched, and that neither has any good reason to fear the other. It must be confessed, however, that the fear of the Canadians is much more unreasonable than that of our own manufacturers. Our tariff is about 35 per cent. on the average on dutiable articles, while the Canadian tariff is only 15 per cent. And if 15 per cent. is sufficient to protect Canada against "ruinous competition with the pauper labor of Europe," and if 35 per cent. is no more than sufficient to protect us against the same thing, assuredly the Canadians need not be afraid to meet us on equal terms.

There is, in reality, no cause for fear on either side. The French manufacturers were as hostile to the commercial treaty of 1860 with England as the manufacturers of this country and Canada are now to the proposed treaty. And yet they found when the treaty went into operation that so far from being crushed out they were decidedly benefited. Commercial freedom enriched the country, and enlarged the home market of the manufacturers, from which they expected to be driven by English competition. This experience let a little light into the minds of French manufacturers, and to-day they would not return to the old policy of prohibition on any account. And so it will be both here and in Canada, if the experiment of free exchange between the two countries is fairly tried. It will, of course, take a little time for business to adjust itself to the new order of things. But in the end all concerned will derive benefits which they will never afterwards be induced to forego for the sake of any supposed advantage to be derived from the system of spoliation which is misalled protection.

The manufacturers of Canada will undoubtedly end by believing themselves the most ill-used, down-trodden and oppressed class in the Dominion, if not in the world. They have, of late, been furnished with numerous opportunities of making known their grievances, and they have not failed to improve them, bringing forward complaints that they were being ruined and that it behoved the Government to enact strict laws, whereby the people would be forced to become their customers whether they wished it or not. When the tariff was first published, there was dire commotion and howls of despair arose from the manufacturing camp, echoed for the nonce by the importers. Then the Committee on manufacturing interests began to hear evidence and the oppressed manufacturers crowded up with extended lists of complaints: they were making a great deal of money

and had established a capital trade; but they were firmly convinced that their souls would be for ever restless were consumers allowed a single chance of buying manufactured articles cheaper from the American than from the Canadian manufacturer. They were honest enough, however, to confess that reciprocity would do them no great harm, nay, would even be beneficial to them, inasmuch as with free trade they might make a "sacrifice market" of the States. Still, if they could be indirectly subsidized, by the Canadian people being forced to purchase their goods at their own prices, they believed they would do well and increase their already large fortunes a little quicker. The consumer himself was carefully kept out of the question; he was of no value except in so far as he might be made a forced purchaser.

One would have thought the manufacturers would, having got along so well and so far, rest content with the Committee's recommendation to Parliament to devise a system of legislation which should enrich the monopolists at the expense of the consumer; but the Government having exhibited a disposition—in the proposed Reciprocity Treaty—to safeguard the interests of the consumer equally with those of the manufacturers, the latter resolved to give up all ideas of reciprocity and fight it out on protection.

So they met in solemn conclave at Hamilton, full of the idea that they there and then should extinguish the treaty for ever, and proclaim to the world the sacredness of their own interests. The result of their deliberations, boiled down and analyzed, is about this: Reciprocity, applied to every branch of trade except manufactures, is worthy of our warmest support; applied to manufactures, whether alone or in common with agriculture, it is subversive of the primary principle of good government, and we, as manufacturers, desirous of making as much money as possible, with as little trouble as possible, record our emphatic protest against the proposed Treaty whereby Canadians at large will be uncommonly benefited.

It is worthy of note that all the committees were not equally opposed to the action of the Treaty. The Cabinet Ware Committee, according to the telegraphic despatch, were divided in opinion on one part and unanimous in acknowledging the advantage of the Treaty on another part of their business. The paper manufacturers had perforce to own that they have no reason to dread competition with the States, but, that they might save themselves from endorsing the Treaty on their own account, they gave as their reason for accepting it that it would benefit our agricultural products. As if the paper makers owned one cent whether the agricultural products were benefited or not. As if they had not been asked to consider and report upon the Treaty with reference to its effect on the trade? And that effect, they very well know will be beneficial; they can now undersell the Americans in their own markets, and are right well aware that they can do it still more effectually when they have free trade.

The reports of some of the committees show an inclination, on the part of certain special interests, to adopt a thoroughly selfish policy. For instance, the Committee on Machinery thinks it is quite right to have reciprocity in agricultural products, but in machinery?—oh! dear no. Machinery is what we make our money out of, so we think it ought to be protected; as for the other interests, let us have free trade by all means.

Now we submit that this is a very narrow and illiberal way of viewing the question. If every separate interest that fancies the consumer should be tried for its support—and high protection means nothing else—is to be listened to, and its decision on the treaty accepted as final, we shall find ourselves deprived of reciprocity for ever. The Hamilton Committee founded their reports on an altogether erroneous principle—that of special protection. Why should the manufacturers of machinery enjoy the monopoly of the Canadian market? Because they are Canadians? It can only be that, for in effect they seek to prevent the consumer from purchasing machinery from the Americans, if the latter offer it cheaper. But, at that rate, it would be just as right for the agriculturists to say to Government—Protect us; never mind the machinery; let that be free, so that we can buy what we want of it as cheaply as possible. Only be sure to legislate in such a manner that Canadians shall be unable to buy their corn from any but ourselves, and at our own prices.

And here it may be remarked that the most patent fact brought out by this meeting at Hamilton is not that the manufacturers are opposed to the treaty as a treaty, but to the principal of reciprocal trade relations on which it is based. The attitude as the manufacturers irresistibly suggests the thought that they