go on buying political influence at German expense.

There are other tensions — as, for example, over the question of fishing limits where Britain and Ireland have been halfhearted allies against the rest but wholehearted enemies of each other. But the real matters at stake are more important than any of these individual instances, even the CAP. The fact is that the assumptions of ideological community on which the EEC was founded – a shared belief in the structures and values of liberal democracy have now given way to a profound political uncertainty. The political instability and tendency towards polarization between neo-Fascist and neo-Communist is notorious in Italy; in France there are strong prospects of a socialist-Communist victory in the next elections; in Britain there is deep apprehension that the country's economic difficulties could lead to acute social and political conflicts.

The politics of the EEC are not overtly determined by such questions; but each country frames its approach to Europe primarily by reference to its own expectations of domestic stability. This

goes beyond the question of "Euro-Communism" can change Whether it can or not, it would divide The Nine. The only main pean country that has preserved prosperity, social cohesion and ada authority is Germany. Germany sidizing the rest. Since this icris. already produced a backlash ada politics, the present German net ment is anxious not to do so to in the case of Britain. But remains that the continued strengton even perhaps the survival, of the Community now depends on chot One might perhaps be thankful office power struggle between Bonn he that was implicit in much of white been said here has been won by At present Herr Schmidt and ffici leagues are leaning over back show understanding to recalcing desparate cases. But it must remisor to question whether their could state afford to do this forever, and tau whether the Community can fin vehicle for a more sensible co- at than it has found in the past than it has found in the past.

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Canada's image in Europe still needs improvement

By André P. Donneur

One of the major elements in the "Third Option" policy - Canada's long-term strategy for becoming more independent of the United States - has been to consolidate and develop relations with Western Europe. This policy has not only consisted of negotiating and concluding an agreement with the European Economic Community – bilateral ties have also been strengthened. Several trips by the Prime Minister to member countries of the Community have drawn much attention. His visit to Paris two years ago was a particularly striking example of this policy; relations with France, which had undergone a period of serious crisis between 1967 and 1969 and a subsequent period of normalization, entered at that time upon a new era of co-operation.

What effects have these wear efforts on Canada's part, over me four years in any case, had on governments? Has what we imager to be Canada's image abroad - 1/2, t of a country riding on the coat-talries United States — been dispelled and rope? In the first place, this bwitl been the unanimous view of fourt servers, Europeans in particularsing Canada ever stated its desire with American influence through thinis Option policy, it was thought of ha siderable number of European ort leaders as a distinct country, affy with its own diplomacy, made is all the efforts of Lester B. Pearson dim Fifties.

Assumptions

to political

uncertainty

have given way