

the two Regional Boards, which they did in March 1942. By early August the Ontario Board had got to the point of promising, in response to union telegrams of protest at the delay, that it would take up the case at its next meeting! It finally handed down its decision towards the end of August. The Nova Scotia Board had made its finding in July. The Nova Scotia finding was a flat no; the Ontario one was so understood by the men, though I believe the Board members say it was not so meant. The men were tired of waiting, and it took all the skill the national officers could muster to keep them from blowing the lid right off then and there. Then the Government granted the Royal Commission; and when it finally reported, more than a year after the men's original application for increases, and reported a flat no (subject to certain relatively minor qualifications), without even discussing the merits of the union's case, the men's patience just gave out completely. I assure you, from a ~~very~~ pretty close acquaintance with the local situation at both plants, that any notion that the men would have been perfectly quiet if Charlie Millard had let them alone is just nonsense. They were blazing angry, and determined to get what they regarded as justice; and a dozen Millards couldn't have stopped them. This thing is a rank-and-file affair if ever there was one, and if King thinks he can settle it without taking that into account he is vastly mistaken. It is worth noting that in the Montreal aircraft plants, where the men feel they have been unjustly treated and put off and put off, indefinitely, the leaders were all for keeping them at work; but they were booted off the platform, and couldn't even finish a single speech. Exactly the same thing would have happened in steel if the leaders had tried to keep the men at work now. I may add that the situation at Sydney was further worsened by a particularly stupid piece of maladroitness just before the Commission's reports came out. There was, of course, technical ground for ordering the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation to cut the bonus to \$4.25; but anyone with any sense would have waited till the situation had ~~been~~ cleared up ~~before~~ before telling the company to impose the cut. But our Department of Labour, in its ineffable wisdom, chose the most delicate moment it could find to issue precisely this order. I understand the company had sense enough to refuse to obey.

The Algoma men's relation with the company, by the way, is excellent. They all think the world of their General Manager, Rahilly. At Sydney the relationship is not as good, but is, I think, improving. The real trouble at both places is not the employer but the Government's policy, or lack of policy.

I said that the men have no use for King, and less than none for Mitchell. This, I think, is an important point to keep in mind. Canadian trade unionists will never ~~forget~~ forget that King is the father of company unionism on this continent, and that he has pushed it as hard as he can here since the war broke out. Nor will they forget that in this last his chief instrument has been Humphrey Mitchell, whom John Stevenson describes, very appropriately, as "the perfect type of Labour Quisling". (Stevenson or Lou Golden can give you Mitchell's record in detail.) Labour particularly resents the fact that King, early in the war, professed to be giving the unions a charter of rights, full collective bargaining power; and then proceeded to deny his own "charter" at every point. He sent Mitchell around hawking his Rockefeller plan in one critical industrial dispute after another; he displaced the National Steel Car Corporation from