

regarded as essential to a complete solution of the problem of philosophy: its weakness is that it still opposes thinking and being as if they were two separate realities of equal worth. Pass along the line of thought, and you do indeed find that there is no thought that has not being as its object; but, on the other hand, this being is conceived as in some sense merely the representation or picture of reality, not reality itself. Follow out the evolution of being, and you at last come to thinking, but this thinking is somehow a product of being. Evidently Schelling has not got rid of dualism, refined as the dualism is to which he has committed himself. Hence he feels himself compelled to seek for a uniting principle, which shall bind together what he has illicitly separated. This principle or absolute thus becomes a sort of "pre-established harmony," accounting for the correspondence of the "subjective subject-object" and the "objective subject-object." Now the idea of a pre-established harmony is merely an enunciation of the problem, not a solution of it. Two relatives are illegitimately separated and then artificially united. The source of Schelling's mistake lies, as I have tried to show above (Chap. VIII), in his failure to subordinate nature to spirit, and in the consequent elimination of self-consciousness from the universe. The