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ference to initiatives which involve real measures of restraint, reduction or elimination of weapons and armed forces and which, therefore, qualify the actual capabilities of states to wage war.

Second, we believe that the Committee on Disarmament should be more involved in dealing with the main issues. Negotiations on some types of weapons systems are appropriately conducted outside the Committee at least in the initial stages, but as others have pointed out it is also the case that weapons of mass destruction threaten the lives of people everywhere, whether they are citizens of large or small states in any part of the globe. We believe, therefore, that the Committee on Disarmament should establish soon a working group on a Chemical Weapons Treaty, as already proposed by many members of the Committee. It is important that all members of the Committee know what are the main questions in dispute concerning the scope of a Treaty and its verification, if they are to have a hand in resolving these issues and especially if they are to accept fully the obligations which a Treaty will impose on the signatories.

Third, we will continue to attach importance to methods of verification which give confidence that agreements are being observed. They are more likely to do so if impartial and competent international agencies are also involved. The administration of safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities by the IAEA is a good example. We therefore accept the principle of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency under the authority of the United Nations, even though there are formidable financial and political obstacles to the establishment of such an agency, and will support the recommendation of the group of experts studying this subject that a comprehensive report be completed by 1981.

Fourth, we are disposed, in principle, to support other initiatives which help to strengthen the role of this organization as an important source of information and expertise of arrangements for the control of arms. It is unsatisfactory for example, that so much of the information in the public domain on military forces and arms should be published by semi-private institutions and not by the United Nations, despite the high calibre of many of these institutions. We are glad, therefore, that consideration is now being given to proposals that the UN gather more information on conventional weapons, including the transfer of such weapons. Some of this information would be derived from the completion by states of the reporting instrument on military expenditures which has been prepared by the *ad hoc* panel of experts and distributed by the Secretary General. We hope it will receive attention from states in all regions.

Other current UN studies will also help to achieve this purpose. We have in mind especially the studies on disarmament and development on nuclear weapons, and on regional disarmament. We also support the proposal that experts follow up the work already done on confidence-building measures. It has been said that study of a subject is a poor substitute for disarmament. But without impartial elucidation of the facts, wider understanding of the issues and mutual confidence, we may not have any substantial progress on disarmament. We accordingly, in principle, favour the undertaking

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