

But the Government of Israel has also a responsibility. It should, in my view, admit in principle the right of UNEF to be deployed on its side of the demarcation line, in accordance with arrangements to be negotiated with it by UNEF. I hope that it will agree to this.

There was one other matter, apart from UNEF, with which we were very preoccupied at the Assembly. We felt strongly that the Resolutions of the last Assembly governing the functions and powers and operations of UNEF, and, above all, those dealing with arrangements to follow the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egypt, should be spelled out with as much precision as possible, so we would all know, especially Israel, where we stood. Our position on this matter was made known to the Assembly and we put forward proposals to this end as clearly as we could. May I quote from what I said at the time.

"First there should be a firm pledge by the Governments of Israel and Egypt to observe scrupulously the provisions of all the 1949 Armistice Agreement. But when we talk about scrupulous observance of the Armistice Agreement, we should mean, not some of its provisions, but all of them. What are they?

"First, the establishment of an armistice demarcation line, which is not a political or territorial boundary, but which cannot be changed except by agreement between the two parties. Also the agreement prohibits any form of aggressive action, warlike or hostile acts, if you like, belligerent acts, or resort to force by the land, sea or air forces of either side. They establish the rights of each side to security and freedom from fear of attack.

"Second, the Secretary-General and the Commander of UNEF should make arrangements with the Governments concerned for the deployment of UNEF on the armistice demarcation line. ...

"Third, regarding the Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran, it should be agreed and affirmed that there should be no interference with innocent passage through or any assertion of belligerent rights in the Straits. ...

"Fourth, the United Nations should be associated to the maximum possible extent, and through detailed arrangements to be worked out, with the civil administration of Gaza."

We had drafted a resolution covering these proposals but we failed to secure enough support for it to justify putting it formally to the vote. Certainly delegations, notably that of the United States, thought that such a resolution could not secure the necessary 2/3 majority and that, therefore, we should sacrifice the better for the possible; that we should play more by ear than by note. Perhaps they were right, but I hope we don't get an earache in the process!