Another option would be to allow only "perimeter" sampling from the surroundings of the destruction site. It seems conceivable that from chemical analysis of such samples one might indicate at least that a chemical warfare agent was being destroyed and perhaps also to which group of agents it might belong.

Further, the actual investigations on the destruction site might be kept to a minimum. The method might accordingly be suitable for sites where other activities must be kept secret.

It is even conceivable that the actual chemical analysis might be carried out at laboratories separated from the destruction site. The concept of "black boxes" should be evaluated with respect to this alternative.

An obvious drawback with regard to performing chemical analysis only of perimeter samples is that no estimation can be made about the amount of agent being destroyed. However, chemical analysis of perimeter samples, combined with toxicity tests on randomized samples of the agent might result in a fairly good assessment of the type of substance and the amounts being destroyed.

The conclusion is that use of chemical methods - combined or not with toxicilogical methods - might result in a series of options, ranging from demonstration of destruction activities to complete quantitative and qualitative identification of stockpile agents being destroyed.

Information on actual experiences of applying these options would most probably increase the prospects for the selection of a proper course of action.