

the force, may fairly claim consideration. In the latter, which comprises the headquarters of a field battery and garrison battery of artillery, a troop of cavalry, and two battalions of infantry, exclusive of the Grand Trunk corps, the grievance has been so severely felt that the various organizations are on the point of breaking up. The commanding officers of the Queen's Own Rifles and 10th Royals would not call their men out for annual drill last year because no armoury or drillshed had been provided. The regiments still struggle to maintain efficiency, and, with commendable spirit, the members of some companies have hired rooms at their own expense in which to carry on their drill. That such an expense should be imposed upon them we think every one will agree is most unjust, and certain, sooner or later, to lead to the demoralization of the force. The unexpected suspension of the customary annual training in camp was also felt as an injustice by many young officers, who, in expectation of going on that service, had incurred considerable expense in uniforms and equipment, besides spending several weeks in preparation at a Military School. Another serious cause of dissatisfaction among the men is the incompleteness of the clothing and accoutrements supplied to many corps. Among the troops in camp during the year 1872 this was very conspicuous in the cavalry. At Niagara we have seen men on parade with several varieties of waist-belt, some without any cross-belt, and others without carbines. The harness also was of various patterns, several horses appearing in the ranks for inspection wearing ordinary snaffle cart bridles, with blinkers attached. Some of the sabres of the men sported sword knots, while others were without, and these numerous incongruities completely marred the effect of the martial display, and made the Volunteers feel ridiculous. Considering the very small remuneration paid by the Government to the Canadian militiaman the very least they should do for him is to send him into the field properly clothed, armed, and equipped. Nothing looks so unsoldier-like or tends more to destroy all *esprit de corps*, than slovenliness of attire; but, until the Government do their part, it is useless to expect the men to aim at perfection. If the expense of the present enrolled force be regarded as too great, let the necessary reduction be made; but we claim that those Volunteers who compose the Active Militia should be treated with more consideration and liberality.—*Free Press*.

THE GERMAN ARMY.

According to the new Army Bill of the German Government the establishment of officers in each company, squadron, and battery of the German Army, which since 1861 has, with few exceptions, consisted of a captain, a first lieutenant, and two second lieutenants, is in future to be increased by another officer of the latter rank. This will cause an addition of 1316 second lieutenants to the infantry, 216 to the cavalry, and 169 to the artillery, which would increase the total strength of the corps of officers to nearly 16,000. The number of officers in the French army is upwards of 26,000. There would, however, be a further addition of about 1552 German officers in the time of war, as provision has been made for forming a reserve of 143 fourth battalions for service in the field and 128 for service in garrisons, besides the 143 depot battalions which now exist. The officers for

these battalions will be selected from the retired list. When the new battalions are formed, the total force at the disposal of Germany will amount to 1,262,810 men, or, after replacing all the losses sustained in the Franco-German war (amounting to 114,000 men, including invalids), 135,000 men more than in 1870. Of this force 711,370 men, with 232,170 horses and 2082 guns, are ready to take the field at any moment, and the 143 field battalions, consisting of at least 188,696 fighting men, would be available for reinforcements. The separation of the field artillery from the garrison artillery, which has already been decided upon by the German Government, will only be carried out after the passing out of the new military budget. A considerable increase is to be made in the cadres of the garrison artillery. Its present establishment consists of 88 companies, which number will be nearly doubled. This increase is considered absolutely necessary in order to avoid the inconveniences caused during the war by men of fifty and upwards having to be called in to complete the strength of the garrison artillery. These men were, of course, entirely unacquainted with the new system of gunnery, and much time was wasted in instructing them.

CAPTAIN FIFE ON INFANTRY TACTICS.

On the 17th November, during H.E. the Viceroy's visit to Agra, Captain Fife, 65th Regiment, delivered a lecture on "Infantry Tactics," at the Agra Branch of the United Service Institute for India. Major-General Sir Henry Norman in the chair. Captain Fife was introduced to the meeting by Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie, corresponding member of the institution. The gallant lecturer recommended the attack of a position in single rank line, preceded by strong bodies of skirmishers in echelon to it, the immediate front of the line being unoccupied and maintained, that thus so much of the enemy's fire at the skirmishers as might be too high, or otherwise miss them, would be diverted from the advancing line. The skirmishers might be in echelon to each flank of the single rank line with battalion interval between, or half the line might follow in echelon to each flank of the skirmishers. In the former of these two arrangements the advance of the skirmishers keeping a proper interval might be thought to be rather difficult, and on parade it would be so to a certain extent as fire has there no real effect; but in war it would be otherwise, for under fire there is a tendency to edge off from the centre where its effects are greatest towards the flanks where they are least, and this, Captain Fife contended, would more than counterbalance the other tendency of the skirmishers to advance direct at the enemy and close the interval. . . . The skirmishers would be 400 yards in advance of the line, and the enemy's attention would become absorbed in the fire-fight with them at about 300 yards as the line approaches within 700 yards of the position. The lecturer contended that to think that because it might, as the line reached a certain distance from the position, be to the evident advantage of the defenders to cease firing on the skirmishers, and fire only on the line, that therefore it would be done, would be as delusive as to argue that, because it is to the manifest advantage of each man to put as many of the enemy as possible *hors de combat*, that therefore there never will or will be any unaimed fire in battle, the actual

fact being that the majority of infantry fire comes under this head. The line would thus advance without firing, and join the skirmishers before coming under much fire aimed or unaimed.

To place the skirmishers and single rank line therefore in echelon, instead of one directly behind the other, would appear to be a highly advantageous arrangement. This is the leading feature in the attack of a position proposed, and the only one claimed by the lecturer as original, the rest being a new combination of the propositions of others. Captain Fife fully concurred with those who held that, under a heavy fire, troops should move by rushes of alternate fractions, and lie down when halted, if no cover be attainable; and to give more freedom for this, and enable all to fire when lying down, he recommended that single fire should be adopted. Captain Fife argued, from the results of recent wars, that the army which, as a tactical principle, sought fighting at closer quarters than its adversary, was usually successful. In discussing defensive tactics, the lecturer strongly deprecated any tendency to court the eventual entry of the enemy into a position defended, in order to take advantage of his consequent confusion to make the counter attack, and said that it was not the moment of prostration, following a partial success, but that succeeding to prolonged failure, which we should resolve to seize for striking a crushing counter blow.—*Delhi Gazette*.

In a recent speech at Liverpool, on the subject of military training, Lord Derby, expressed a firm belief in the moral taught by the fable of the hare and the tortoise, and, warning "dashing, brilliant young fellows," he encouraged the possessors of "exceptional slowness of comprehension;" then followed a wise truth—"What a man really takes a keen interest in he is seldom too dull to understand and to do well; and conversely, when a man does not care to put the best of his brains into a thing, no amount of mere cleverness will secure a success." With all his varied experience in the wide world and its history at his disposal, Lord Derby chose the modern army of Germany as an instance to bear out his argument: "The most conspicuous instance of complete efficiency and success in active life recently witnessed is that which was obtained three years ago by the military organization of Germany; and I am told by those who ought to be the best judges, that both among Germans themselves and many other foreign critics efficiency and success are ascribed not so much to any extraordinary display of genius or originality of design on the part of some few individuals as to the general habit of minute and almost microscopic attention to every detail of duty. But to acquire and keep up in every-day work a habit of concentrated attention in details two things are necessary—training and energy."

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