

were women, all the rest men. And what do you suppose they were engaged in? The old enterprise of upsetting Moses. And yet Moses has to-day in the synagogues of Boston, more people that preach him than ever before. It is astonishing how much upsetting it takes to upset Moses. It is like upsetting a granite cube. Turn it on which face you will, there it stands, as solid as ever. The cube is used to being upset, and does not mind it. It always amuses me when I hear a fresh cry from some new quarter, averring that some man, whom nobody has ever heard of, has found out a sure way of doing what others have failed in. And now here comes Jim Manly, and Moses has to be upset again. Ah, well!" and the deacon sighed. There was a roar of laughter that made the rafters of the old saw-mill ring, and all joined in except Jim.

ESSAY ON MEMORY.

BY THE LATE DAVID JOSEPH STRAMBERG.

I. What is memory? Is it not the mind's power of retaining its possessions and applying them to future use?

Every mind from an early period possesses this power. In virtue of it, and in union with judgment, the infant soon learns to distinguish its mother from all others. Thus he has laid the foundation of a most valuable experimental philosophy. Thus he makes the discovery and retains the conviction that fire burns, and that in cases of collision, action and reaction being equal, it is unwise to come violently against bedposts or the legs of chairs and tables. The first use of memory is to treasure up experiences like these; just as the first use of the reasoning faculty is to draw deductions from them. With the help of these two faculties, our little philosopher on all fours has already learned lessons as important in the art of self-preservation as any which he will afterwards learn. If he had no memory, he would forget that the candle burned his finger yesterday, and so he would put it into the flame to-day. If he had no judgment, he would see no necessary resemblance between the burning candle and the red-hot poker; but having both, he grows cautious in his movements. In every sound mind, memory develops early; almost as early as observation; and in the earliest stage the objects about which it is employed are much alike; being those things which are most necessary to the well-being of the reminiscent babe. But soon, at the third or fourth year, you can discern differences. One will show a readiness in recognizing faces; another for topography; another for letters, etc.

Different minds have different affinities, and the things of which we are fondest, are the things which we find it easiest to remember. Everybody has a memory, but every one has not the same natural tendencies, and therefore every one does not remember with equal facility the same sort of things. One has a turn for natural objects, and holds in memory a thousand plants or animals: the turn of another is more for persons, and, like Cyrus, he can name every soldier in his army: a third has a propensity for languages, a fourth for music, a fifth for recital, and so on. Themistocles could call by name all the citizens of Athens, whose number was 20,000. Mithridates, king of Pontus, had an empire in which twenty-two languages were spoken, and it is asserted that there was not a province in which he could not administer justice, nor a subject with whom he could not converse.

II. As to the principle on which the culture of Memory depends, it is a general law that all our powers, both of body and mind, may be strengthened by applying them to their proper uses. Thus the natural faculty of memory may be improved by mere exercise. And further, besides the improvement which memory admits of by exercise, it may be greatly aided by the arrangement of our ideas. Every person may recollect, on entering on any new species of study, the difficulty of treasuring up in the memory the elementary principles; and the facility which we acquire as our knowledge becomes more extensive. In every science the ideas are connected together by some associating principle: in one science by associations founded on the relations of cause and effect; in another by the necessary relations of mathematical truths; in a third by the relations of time or place. In proportion as a science becomes more familiar to us, we acquire a greater command of insight into its objects. Every object of our knowledge is related to a variety of others, and may come to our thoughts sometimes by one association and sometimes by another. Thus, in proportion to the increase of our knowledge will be the increase of our means of memorizing, by association of ideas. The facility of retaining a new fact will depend on the perceived relations which it bears to our former knowledge; for thus it does not load the memory, but gives us a firmer hold of all our previous knowledge with which it is connected. Thus a good index supersedes the labor of years; as Pope has very happily expressed it,

"Though index-learning turns no student pale,
It holds the eel of science by the tail."

III. Memory, like all other blessings, may