

the powers of the Federal Government, in that country? First, as the main object for which the union itself was formed, we find the exclusive power to make war, and, for that purpose, to raise and equip armies and fleets; to make peace, and to conclude treaties of commerce with foreign powers; and, as indispensable requisites for the exercise of these powers, the further power of levying taxes. These, it is quite obvious, have reference *only* to the foreign relations of the confederation. The powers of the Federal Government to interfere in what are exclusively the internal affairs of the Union, are few and inconsiderable. The principal are those of controlling the Post Office, and enacting patent and copyright laws. Besides these, authority over all territories belonging to the Union, but not included in any individual State, is vested exclusively in the Federal Government.

It would be extremely difficult—would it not be impossible?—to extend the prerogatives of a Federal Government, in the Provinces, one inch beyond the limits within which they are confined in that republican confederation, without bringing it into immediate and dangerous collision with those of the individual Provinces. But how far must the prerogatives of the Provincial, Federal Government fall within those limits! From the position of the Provinces as British Colonies, their central Government could not, without some very material modification of their present relations with the Mother Country, have the power of making war and of concluding treaties of peace and commerce, on its own account. The possession of the right to exercise that power, and to make provision for its exercise, is that which gives standing to the Federal Government of the United States; and brings it what respect it does possess from the individual States. The Provincial, Federal Government not having this right, and consequently having no power to raise and equip armies and fleets, and so construct and control works of national defence, the only power left for it to exercise, would be—following, when possible, the model of the United States—those of managing the Post Office; and those of legislating upon questions of naturalization,

patent and copyright. It could not be permitted to levy taxes beyond the mere requirements of its own civil list. An inevitable consequence of this would be, that impost duties and other considerable sources of revenue, in the different Provinces, would still be under their separate control. Then there would necessarily be separate customs establishments, and conflicting, commercial regulations, as at present. It is obvious that *it would never pay* to keep up a Federal Government, however moderate the expense of doing so, to perform such comparatively unimportant duties. But, apart from all considerations of expense, such an institution, thus almost objectless and powerless, would become at once, an object of contempt; and would be practically no Government at all.

But in consenting to a union of the Provinces, of whatever nature such union might be, the Imperial Government would probably be ready to yield to them a largely increased share of national privileges, attended with proportionate, national responsibilities, Great Britain obviously desires, even now, to bestow upon these Provinces the charge of providing and sustaining the naval and military forces necessary to their security against internal disorder and foreign aggression. The bestowal of this charge would alone, it cannot be doubted, give to the Federal Government an important rank as a *national* Government; and would ensure it a great degree of moral weight in every section of the Confederation. It is further probable, and certainly very desirable, that, in the event of a Provincial Union, the immense tract known as the Hudson's Bay Company's Territories, or Rupert's Land, would very soon come under the immediate control of the central Government. If that union were a Federal one, this important acquisition to its exclusive jurisdiction, would certainly both raise and strengthen its position. But both these conditions—one of them certainly an essential one—to the successful maintenance of a Federal Government, rest upon probabilities pending in the uncertain future; and upon probabilities over which those most interested in the union have no control.

But let the imperial Government guarantee both conditions; then upon what terms is