

of government lately in various ways; I propose, therefore, to confine myself to local considerations.

I take the liberty of expressing my opinion, founded upon the observations made in my present situation, that, if it is in view to attach Runjeet Singh to the British Government, and to make him a friend by conciliation, the concession which he requires is essentially necessary for that purpose. As long as the British Government appears to be the bar, and the only bar, to his subjugation of the Sikhs and consequent aggrandisement, he will not, I conceive, be cordially attached to it; and if his attachment is to be gained by any means, none other are so likely to secure it as this concession, without which all other attempts to obtain his co-operation by conciliation would probably be fruitless.

Considerations may be adduced from the actual state of the country to diminish the objections to the sacrifice. The reserve hitherto held by government on this point, has not prevented the gradual extension of the power of Runjeet Singh over the territories between the Sutlej and the Jumna. It has hitherto retarded the complete subjugation, but its effect as a check upon Runjeet Singh has diminished, and will continue to diminish. His encroachments have been progressive, and he has taken the opportunity, when a British Envoy was in his camp, to make them more remarkable and more excessive than ever before.

He has proceeded with his whole force to Umballa, which is not far distant from the post of Kurnal; and there is reason to expect that he will not spare Jegadree, which is near to that part of the Jumna which is protected by the station Suharunpoor.

Without reference, therefore, to the general question of the expediency of admitting the extension of Runjeet Singh's power, it appears that a refusal to make the declaration which he requires, unaccompanied by a determination to oppose his aggressions, would perpetuate his distrust of the British Go-