

historical analogies, the Chilean Christian Democrat Party has replaced its patron saint Jacques Maritain with Georges Bidault. A return to the Cold War, refusal of the historical compromise and submission to the institutional right — that would be the price to pay for a substantial attenuation of the internal war and would serve as the basis of a right-wing populist government. Such a scenario could receive passive support from part of the Popular Unity, whose sole objective right now is tactical — get the military back to their barracks.

The "Caramanlis scenario" would follow the "Livingstone scenario" if the latter were to unfold rapidly; the military right wing would hand over power to the civilian right wing. But if the Livingstone scenario became drawn out into a lengthy affair, a left-wing variant would then become possible. The army, too deeply divided, would offer the ever-more-demanding working classes a transition to a centre-left populist government. We shall use the name "Campora scenario" — after Argentina's 1973 President — for the complex interplay in which elderly statesmen, worn down under the harness of long-gone politics, try to manoeuvre between a di-

vided but still reactionary army and the increasingly radical masses. In this model, the coalition inevitably breaks up in the conflict between proponents of the established order and proponents of change.

The above scenarios are all possible but the simplest and likeliest one would see the immediate future prolonged indefinitely, Pinochet handing over power to Pinochet all the way to 1987. In such a scenario the army would maintain its cohesiveness and its confidence in Pinochet despite the economic crisis and the cooling of relations with Washington. Washington's opposition would be used to advantage by Pinochet in a nationalistic offensive and neutralized by support from the other military dictatorships on the continent. The economic crisis would lead to opposition from the various social and economic pressure groups, but it would be opposition of a scattered nature, with no political expression, and would ultimately be dissolved by the tactical skill of the junta. The Pinochet scenario has two variants: "Papadopoulos variant" offers ten additional years of repression, while the "Franco variant" offers 30 years of national reconstruction.

Rewriting the laws of war: the Geneva Protocols of 1977

By L. C. Green

The opinion seems to be a widely held that, since the adoption of the Pact of Paris (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) in 1928, particularly as interpreted by the Nuremberg Tribunal, war, or at least aggressive war, has been not merely illegal but criminal. This belief has been strengthened by a variety of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, culminating in the adoption by that body in December 1974 of the Definition of Aggression embodied in Resolution 3314 (XXIX). Moreover, many commentators have argued that Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations have rendered all forms of war illegal, with the exception of a resort to self-defence in response to an attack already launched — thus excluding any possibility of action by

way of preventive or anticipatory self-defence. In addition, a number of Third World and Eastern European countries have sought to contend that, despite Article 51 of the Charter, no action may properly be described as self-defence unless it is authorized by the Security Council, even though the effect of this interpretation is virtually to turn Article 51 upside down.

It is relatively simple to declare war illegal or criminal. Preventing states or groups — whether they are called national liberation movements or not — from resorting to force and launching armed conflict is another matter altogether. Since 1945, the world has experienced numerous conflicts of this kind — even though none of them have involved direct confrontation