

Security Intelligence Service

relates to the exchange of information and if it relates to Canada although taking place in other parts of the world, my comment about the previous omission is even more valid.

We are not going to get information about activities affecting Canada from our allies and friends unless we are prepared to share with our allies and friends information relating to any activities that we run across in Canada which affects them. That stands to reason. Exchange of information is exchange of information. It is not a one-way street. Therefore, I am a little worried. I have checked the French version of the same definition and it comes out just about the same; c) les activités qui touchent le Canada ou s'y déroulent et visent à favoriser l'usage de la violence dans le but d'atteindre un objectif politique au Canada ou dans un État étranger. It says "in a foreign state", and it does not necessarily mean a friendly state; "achieving a political objective within Canada or a foreign state".

● (1240)

Were there to be, for example, a group of Cubans who happen to be in Canada plotting, if you like, or organizing some way of changing the regime in Cuba, would that be a legitimate activity for investigation by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service? While Bill C-157 was pretty sloppily drafted, Mr. Speaker, there is some questionable drafting in this new Bill despite the bouquets I was throwing around a little earlier. That worries me.

Another matter of considerable concern is the sponsor, if you like, of this particular Bill. It seems to me in looking back over the last 15 years or so that practically everything this Government touches, it soils. There are lots of things one can point to. I think particularly of the Department of External Affairs, where I was once a foreign service officer, which the Government has managed somehow or other to downgrade and soil. I do not know whether it has been deliberate, but it has. The most recent changes effected in that Department have caused complete confusion there and in other Government Departments. I have heard it said, for example, that when domestic industry get parts or patents or processes from abroad, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce has to send its employees abroad to discover these things.

The integration of Canada's outlook on the world, projecting its views of the world, and enlisting trade support or the development of markets abroad was very much in the hands of the Department of External Affairs in its overseas operations, through the embassy. What we have now is just one example of how this Government has distorted, soiled or twisted practically everything it touches. It worries me.

A Bill of this sort, Mr. Speaker, purporting to deal with an activity of this sort, security and intelligence, sponsored by this Government, is *ipso facto* suspect because this Government is not trusted. That has been said before and I am afraid it is high time the Government realized that in nearly all its activities it is not trusted. The Department of National Revenue is still going through a process of trying to re-establish itself, if it ever can. It is not the public servants who are doing

it, Mr. Speaker; it is the Ministers who have this twisted view of how their activities should be developed.

Mr. Robison (Burnaby): Mr. Speaker, I would like to comment and ask the Hon. Member a question. One of the provisions of this legislation which has drawn a good deal of fire is the provision contained in Clause 16, and I believe it was contained in Clause 18 of the predecessor Bill, which would permit the new security service to embark on activities totally unrelated to national security. Instead, the service would for the first time have responsibilities with respect to the conduct of international affairs and external affairs in Canada. I draw to the Hon. Member's attention Clause 16 which reads:

—the Service may, in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada, assist the Minister of National Defence or the Secretary of State for External Affairs, within Canada, in the collection of information or intelligence relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of

- (a) any foreign state or group of foreign states; or
- (b) any person other than—

A Canadian citizen or landed immigrant, in effect. As the House will appreciate, this extends to the service the power to, in effect, use all of the intrusive techniques set out in this Bill against targets who pose no threat whatsoever to national security. It could be a source of information to the government of the day in its conduct of external affairs.

Given the sweeping nature of the powers proposed in this legislation, for example the power to open first-class mail, examine all government records including income tax records, family allowance, unemployment insurance files and all other files in the possession of the government, the power to break into any place and examine private records—

Mr. Kaplan: They can do it now.

Mr. Robison (Burnaby):—including medical records and others—and the Solicitor General suggests they can break in anywhere they want now—

Mr. Kaplan: With a warrant.

Mr. Robison (Burnaby):—whether doctors' offices, Members of Parliament or lawyers, journalists and so on.

Mr. Kaplan: You know they can do that now under the present law.

Mr. Robison (Burnaby): One would have hoped that the Solicitor General would have given very clear instructions to the Service that such activities are inappropriate. I would welcome the intervention of the Solicitor General to that effect.

Given that the functions of the Service are supposed to be related, one would have thought, to national security, what are the Hon. Member for Esquimalt-Saanich's views with respect to this very important extension of the powers of the new security service into the realm of using intrusive techniques to collect information for the conduct of international affairs in Canada?