

total naval manpower requirement will continue to be about 17,500 men. The red line shows the decline in total naval strength.

You will notice on the left side of the chart that early in 1964 manpower equalled the requirement, but the two lines have been diverging ever since. In April/May, 1966, the requirement has been reduced by the four World War II frigates which, as the Minister reported to you, will shortly be offered to Crown Assets for disposal. But the gap remains. Even if all the remaining older destroyers and frigates of the Fleet are disposed of, we will still have a shortage of 1,500 men required to man remaining commitments.

Our present net loss-rate of about 65 men per month will make it necessary to reduce six or seven additional destroyers to maintenance crews by May 1967, two of which will be undergoing modernization. We will then have only 13 or 14 out of 23 destroyers in full commission—nine on the East Coast and four or five on the West Coast.

I am happy to report that the RCAF portion of Maritime Command is in a very healthy condition, being manned to 95% of its establishment of 3,210 airmen and enjoying an 87% re-engagement rate, and at the moment there is no manning problem in respect to officers of either service.

If we are to meet our commitments it is obvious that something must be done to attract many more recruits to the navy. The minister has drawn your attention to a number of Service inadequacies and has expressed his intention of correcting them as soon as possible. In my Command, we will continue to press vigorously for those improvements in service conditions which will attract men to, and retain them in the service. The re-engagement rate for the navy has always been lower than the other services and this is a reflection of the inevitable instability of naval life involving regular and long separations from one's family. This makes it all the more important for the navy to have a high recruiting rate to cover this wastage.

#### *Yearly Employment of Forces*

Notwithstanding these besetting difficulties, the forces which are fully operational maintain a lively tempo. For example here on the slide is the schedule of major exercises in the Atlantic in which units of the Maritime Command are taking part this year. Some are national; some NATO; some Canada-U.S. This schedule is only the portion of the iceberg which shows above the surface. It represents the culmination of months of individual crew training, squadron training and inter-type training which must be completed before the ships and aircraft are ready for advanced exercises. West Coast forces are similarly committed to strenuous and exacting major exercise programmes.

In addition to these major exercises our ships and aircraft are constantly on patrol on and over our Maritime areas of responsibility on both coasts. Our Maritime Patrol aircraft fly daily reconnaissance sorties throughout these areas and frequently conduct surveillance flights to the more remote regions of the areas—many of these flights in the Atlantic terminate in such bases as Thule, Iceland, United Kingdom and the Azores. The Trackers flying from shore bases provide valuable coverage to our inshore areas and are particularly suited to surveillance of the Soviet fishing fleet activities.