

government are to be given - as I think they should - room to manoeuvre in negotiation, they will not abandon any principle that has been laid down to guide such negotiation.

This is no easy task, especially in dealing with Communist states. Our fear of Communism is understandably so great that if in negotiation we make a concession on any point of detail, and this becomes public as it nearly always does, we may be accused of deserting a principle or of being "soft". This, in fact, can be carried to such a point that fear, both of the Communist and the critic, can freeze diplomacy completely so that no progress of any kind can be made. I hope that we can avoid this purely static position in the coming year just as I hope we can avoid clutching at every proposal as promising peace.

The other difficulty is that any concession or compromise of any kind can be and often is interpreted by a Communist opponent as a sign of weakness generally, and will, therefore, encourage him to be more intransigent than ever.

We have plenty of examples of both these difficulties in contemporary negotiations with Communist governments, especially over Korea and Germany.

The best way, as I see it, to deal with this situation - negotiating with Communist Governments - is to decide in advance what the points and principles are on which you will stand fast and then not to budge from them. At the same time, it is necessary to be flexible on non-essential matters, without worrying too much about the misinterpretation which may be given to a conciliatory attitude on these matters. There are other useful rules to follow. We should not permit the Communists to drag us down to their level of debate and dialectic. In discussion we should not mistake villification for vigour, or sound and fury for sense and firmness.

We would be wise, I think, to follow the advice of a distinguished United States delegate to the United Nations, Senator Warren Austin when he said; "Always leave your enemy room to retreat". That seems to me to make sense, if not in war, at least in negotiation, even with Communists. Equally good advice would be not to allow yourself to be manoeuvred into a blind alley.

Finally, we should resist the Anglo-Saxon failing of making a moral issue of every separate political problem. There are some problems that can be dealt with on the basis of political expediency; others only on the basis of moral principle. It is desirable, though often difficult, to recognize the distinction.

To the Communists, of course, there is no such difficulty, because there is no such thing as a moral issue. This may seem to give them a short-run advantage. But in the long-run a foreign policy which has a sound moral basis will prevail over one which has not, providing we build on that base a structure of strength with freedom.