

accept important practical limitations upon the universal application of the principle.

First of all, we must face the fact that, now and as far ahead as we can see, the one world, which we all hoped for at the end of the Second World War, is unattainable. There seems to be no real prospect of our being able to establish friendly or even normal relationships with the Soviet world in the foreseeable future. Of course we should remain receptive to any genuine compromise which may be offered by the Soviet Union, but it would be folly for us not to recognize that the present divisions in the world which result primarily from Soviet Russian policies, will continue for some time to come.

The second limitation is that imposed by strategic considerations and the presently available military and economic resources of the free countries. We believe that aggression of all kinds everywhere should be frustrated. But we are by no means certain that the Free World yet disposes of the strength necessary to give effect in every part of the world to this article of our faith. The blunt fact is that, in present circumstances, unlimited collective security everywhere, because of the dispersal of resources involved, might mean no real security anywhere. On the other hand, failure to stand by the principle of collective security and seek to enforce it in any clear case of aggression would strike at the base of confidence on which the United Nations is founded.

If the United Nations is to avoid this dilemma; if it is to avoid a fatal dispersal of strength and at the same time maintain support for the essential security obligations of the Charter then the most careful judgment must be exercised on each occasion. Our representatives in the United Nations will have to make a deliberate calculation of the moral and strategic factors present in each particular issue involving aggression or threat of aggression. These decisions will be difficult especially because they will often have to be made rapidly and without very thorough examination.

Speaking of this problem only a few days ago in the House of Commons my Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, suggested that these decisions - how to give effect on any given occasion to the security obligations of the Charter - might be made easier by the acceptance of certain principles:

(1) in every situation, our obligation under the Charter to do whatever we can to maintain the principle of collective security should be discharged; in other words, we should recognize unprovoked aggression for what it is, whether, committed by great or small powers; and take appropriate action - but this action may have to vary according to circumstances;

(2) we should never formally condemn an aggressor until the fact of his aggression has been clearly proven, and until the mediatory and conciliatory functions of the United Nations have been exhausted;

(3) condemnation of aggression does not mean that in every case economic and military sanctions must follow; indeed it is essential, and only ordinary common sense, that measures adopted against