

Multilateral Monitoring Techniques

Probably the most important result of field operations has been the lessons learned following the introduction of new inspection techniques and the application of technologies to the multilateral monitoring and verification process. Methodologies and mechanisms for future on-going monitoring and verification purposes are summarized in Annex "C". During the 65 inspections conducted by UNSCOM and the IAEA, modifications to procedures have taken place in almost every field. In the early stages, the IAEA learned of the shortfalls in the safeguards inspection programme. The crucial importance of inspectors having unimpeded rights of access to relevant materials and sites (including suspect sites) is now recognized. In the use of on-site inspections, UNSCOM had developed a number of different inspection scenarios. The initial one provided for a standard team for a short period (an average of 20 inspectors for 10 days). Later, the concept of a very small team for a longer period (perhaps 4 specialists for 45-60 days) was explored. Finally, a large team (50 inspectors) divided into specialist groups (5-7 inspectors) for different periods of time was used. The need to tailor on-site inspections to specific applications is now recognized.

The first use of overhead imagery on a sustained basis and as an important supplement to existing monitoring assets for multilateral arms control purposes was initiated in July of 1991. By the end of 1993, a total of 215 U2 missions had been flown on behalf of the United Nations. There have been coordinated on occasion with helicopter surveillance (for which 330 mission have been flown). Overhead imagery has proven itself as an effective monitoring tool and is likely to form the core of a future compliance monitoring regime. UNSCOM has been a prime innovator in terms of applying overhead imagery as a significant monitoring tool in a multilateral verification scenario. For a summary of methodologies and mechanisms applied by UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1993, see Annex "D".

Results

Although some inspections relating to the determination of the accuracy of baseline data are likely to continue as well as removal/destruction activity, the results of these two stages of the on-going monitoring process are encouraging:

- In the nuclear area, for example, the IAEA has identified and placed under safeguards the proscribed nuclear material and has initiated a removal program. Facilities related to proscribed activities have been destroyed -- the IAEA, while not possessing a full knowledge of the Iraqi nuclear weapon research program, is confident that enough is known to guard against its reactivation.