

action they would favour. The report is then generally tailored accordingly. Military advice, particularly from the field, is often the first casualty.

A number of ideas have been advanced to address this problem. Some have suggested energizing the **Military Staff Committee**, but few Member States are keen to enhance further the influence of the P-5, who control this body. Others have suggested creating a subsidiary body of the Security Council with high-level military advisers from each of its Member States to provide the Council with views supplementary to those of the Secretary-General. However, cumbersome machinery may not be the answer - the Council's flexibility, and often its speed, are among its key assets - and excellent advice is available from the Secretariat, which draws on field and headquarter perspectives. Rather, the Secretariat should gird its loins and deliver its best advice to the Council, rather than what the P-5 would prefer to hear. While some Council members will be irritated in the short run by the laying bare of inconvenient facts for the media and others to see, all Member States would have occasion to be grateful in the long run if serious and costly mistakes were thus avoided.

The Security Council must learn to deal more assertively at the political level with the **parties to a conflict** and with the host authorities of PKOs, relying on such mechanisms as the Groups of Friends of the Secretary-General for individual crises.³⁰ The sharp reduction in personnel demanded by the Rwandan Government in exchange for its consent to a mandate renewal of UNAMIR in December, 1995, a demand ultimately accepted by the Council, drove Canada to withdraw from the force (which two of its generals led through its darkest hours), convinced that UNAMIR could no longer discharge its mandate adequately. UNAMIR withdrew from Rwanda soon thereafter.

It is also important that the Security Council, while avoiding 'mission creep', remain true to its vision and earlier decisions.³¹ In this connection, it will be critical that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, created with such fanfare in 1993 and under-financed ever since, be given the political and material support necessary to succeed in its task. If it fails, the Council's

³⁰ These informal Groups, involving countries both on and off the Council have emerged to help steer given issues at the UN. The phenomenon is not entirely new, e.g. the "Contact Group" for Namibia from 1978 to 1990. However, such groups have proliferated in the 1990's. The groups are largely self-selecting, although the Secretary-General formally nominates them. They have played a valuable role in the design and implementation of UN strategies in e.g. Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti and Georgia. The emergence of such groups, while useful to the Secretary-General and welcomed by most Security Council members as preparing the ground effectively for Council action, has been greeted with dismay by others, e.g. New Zealand. Such countries complain that the "self-appointed" Groups of Friends undermining the sovereign equality of all Member States, and usurping the role of the full Council. Groups of Friends nevertheless seem to be here to stay.

³¹ 'Mission creep' is a syndrome through which the Council, often in sheer frustration or in order to appease public pressure, incrementally mandates a shift from limited objectives for a PKO to broader ones, sometimes including enforcement, often without providing the resources necessary to achieve the new, more ambitious, objectives.