

improvements and the implementation of still diverging military doctrines. Realism suggests however that neither will accept anything less than parity throughout the 'seventies,⁸¹ and that Moscow will continue to experience an enhanced sense of invulnerability. Accordingly, military relations with Washington will increasingly be concerned with the pace and opportunity costs of a continuing defense effort. SALT I has already established a degree of common interest in checking the arms race, and SALT II will in all probability yield added limitations and possibly a modest reduction of offensive forces. Moreover SALT I has had significant psycho-political reassurance effects, adding substantially to the sense of security engendered by the more marginal arms control arrangements of previous years. So long as an "adventurer" does not come into the White House, and so long as there is a continuing effort to avoid confrontations and reduce the likelihood of accidental war, the Soviets have little to fear militarily from the United States.⁸² As Soviet fears decline, so does the need for military and foreign political action to offset the American threat. So also does the possibility that Washington will interpret Soviet negotiating concessions as a sign of weakness. Insofar as Moscow wishes to reduce the economic costs of defense and to avoid the emergence of an unstable structure of forces on both sides, the situation favours a policy of collaboration with Washington in further measures of arms control.

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