km) being replaced by SS-23s (range = 500 km); Frogs (range = 70 km) being replaced by SS-21s (range = 120 km); and SS-12s (range = 900 km) being replaced by SS-22s (equivalent range).³⁶ It was noted that the Frog-7s and Scud-Bs believed to be deployed on the Kola Peninsula would apparently remain.³⁷

According to Swedish analyst Lars Christiansson, there remained about 1,200 Soviet nuclear weapons (presumably excluding the SLBM warheads of the Kola-based Northern Fleet, whose numbers alone exceed this total) in the "immediate vicinity" of the proposed Nordic NWFZ.³⁸ Another recent study lists among Soviet nuclear weapons "deployed for use in the Nordic area" a total of 569-670 land-based warheads (including shorter-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and artillery shells), 328 dual-purpose, shorter-range missiles aboard the ships of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, and 550 aboard those of the Northern Fleet. Excluded from the estimate were both air-delivered weapons and nuclear mines and torpedoes.³⁹

The foregoing narrative should have amply demonstrated that a full-fledged Nordic NWFZ is scarcely lurking around the corner. Even its most enthusiastic and optimistic proponents concede that, if it is to come to fruition at all, it will take many more years of patient analysis, advocacy, consultations and, eventually, actual negotiations between the states concerned. In the meantime, the option for other circumpolar countries of merely assimilating themselves with such a zone simply does not exist.

^{36.} Lars Christiansson, "Soviet Initiative Changes Nothing," Stockholm Svenska Dagbladet,

¹⁵ November 1986, p. 4, in: FBIS — WE, 19 November 1986, p. P3.

^{37. &}quot;Now Look Again," Economist, 22 November 1986.

^{38.} Christiansson, op. cit. note 36.

^{39.} Tomas Ries, "Nuclear Weapons and the Zone," cited in: ACR, March 1986, p. 404.B.43.