



the main components of their strategic nuclear arsenals — land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. At one point in their discussion, they also agreed to eliminate ballistic missiles completely in ten years.

On intermediate-range nuclear weapons, there was similar provisional agreement on their complete elimination from Europe within five years, with the USSR and USA each retaining only 100 warheads in Soviet Asia and the continental USA respectively. The USA and Soviet Union also agreed on the need to negotiate reductions in short-range nuclear arsenals.

There was mutual acceptance of a step-by-step process for reducing nuclear tests, leading eventually to a complete cessation of tests once nuclear weapons had been abolished. There was a broad convergence of view on the verification procedures to be applied to the various measures.

The fact that such detailed discussions occurred and resulted in such wide-ranging tentative agreement attests to the seriousness and dedication with which the two sides have been approaching their task. The main significance lies in the demonstration that major, negotiated reductions in nuclear arsenals need not be an impossible dream.

At Reykjavik three lessons were reinforced. The first two are: both sides are serious; and arms control is possible. But the third lesson is that arms control will not come easily. It is a deliberate and difficult process.

The more sobering element of reality as it has emerged from Reykjavik lies in the fact that the two sides remain far apart in their views on the future role of strategic defences. This is not a question of saying yes or no to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) but of finding a way of managing the research on defensive weapons in which both sides are engaged.

A key issue between the two governments is whether research is limited to

the laboratory under the existing Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. That is a treaty with two signing parties — the United States and the Soviet Union. Its text does not refer directly to research, although the private negotiating record of either side may mention research. The agreement on what precisely is intended in that treaty is for these two governments who are the parties to the agreement to work out.

It is important to note that this is a different issue from the debate we have seen in recent months over what is allowed by agreed statement 'D' of the ABM treaty referring to ABM systems based on other physical principles. Our interest is to ensure strict adherence to that treaty, and continued respect by both sides for the integrity of this fundamental arms control agreement.

The situation today in no way represents a step backward from the situation as it existed prior to the Reykjavik meeting. Technological, political and legal uncertainties and disagreements have always characterized the debate on strategic defence. Even in this area, however, there has in our judgement been some movement towards better mutual understanding, in that the legitimacy of research related to strategic defence is now accepted by both

sides. In a treaty that refers explicitly only to 'development, testing and deployment,' the issue has become, in effect, what are the limits on permissible research?

Mr. Speaker, we ought not to allow ourselves to focus exclusively on nuclear and strategic arms questions as if they constituted the totality of East-West relations. True, these issues have inescapably become the central element of this relationship, but they should not be seen in isolation from the broader context. There are other areas of arms control, most notably in relation to chemical weapons, where there is ground for cautious optimism. Further, we understand that on human rights questions and on a range of bilateral matters, progress continues to be made. Mr. Speaker, I should add that I was encouraged by my own talks on human rights with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, when he visited Ottawa. Our discussion was frank and more open than I believe has been the case before. Canada believes progress here and on regional issues is essential to enable us to establish trust in each other's intentions. This process of building trust is far from finished.

Peace and security require patience and persistence. Emotional swings be-



US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev meeting across the table, with only their interpreters present, during Reykjavik Summit. Canapress