

nothing should be done in the establishment of a united and free Korea which would carry the slightest menace to Korea's neighbours. Strict observance of these principles may, I am aware, in certain circumstances, complicate the immediate problems which face the United Nations Commander in Korea. Nevertheless I am convinced that we must be guided by them constantly as long as there is any chance of preventing the war from spreading. It may be that the Chinese Communists will demonstrate by their future actions that what they intend is an unlimited aggression against Korea. If unhappily that turns out to be the case, it will be necessary for the United Nations to take knowledge of the fact and to enlarge the field of action of the United Nations Commander. The aggressor may have to be met where he comes from. The Canadian Government could hardly, however, be party to any action which has not been sanctioned by the United Nations or support within the United Nations any action to extend the field of operations unless and until it is clear that Chinese Communist forces have been sent to Korea on more than a protective and border mission.

The same desire to localize the conflict and prevent it from spreading has dictated the policy which we have followed, and will continue to follow, over Formosa. We appreciated the necessity for action which President Truman took on the 27th of June in ordering the United States Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa, because it seemed to provide a way of neutralizing that island during the course of the fighting in Korea. We also understood the explanatory comment which President Truman gave in his press conference on the 31st of August when he declared: "of course, it will not be necessary to keep the Seventh Fleet in the Formosan Straits if the Korean thing is settled. That is a flank protection on our part for the United Nations forces". The question of Formosa has now been placed by the United States on the agenda of the General Assembly. We will be prepared to support in the United Nations any appropriate resolution which would authorize the continuance of this neutralization of Formosa so long as the war in Korea makes that necessary. We are in some doubt, however, as to whether any more comprehensive action by the United Nations over Formosa could usefully be taken at this time...

16. Excerpts from a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the Federal-Provincial Conference in Ottawa, December 4, 1950

The vital question at the present time, transcending immeasurably all other questions, is how great is the risk of a major war...

At the moment, the focus of our hopes and fears is Korea. We must strive to find a solution to the grave and menacing problem that has arisen there. This will be no easy task. Before it can be done, moreover, there must be a stabilization of the military front in Korea on a line which can be firmly held. Our military advice gives us reason to hope that in spite of heavy initial losses before the counter-offensive from the North, such a line can be established and maintained.