



Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in Bonn with Chancellor Helmut Kohl.
Bundesbildstelle Bonn

He said he is convinced that "casting a fresh linkage—of military strategy with, but subordinate to, strong political purpose—must become the highest priority of East and West alike," and that this is a time of changing realities, a time to weed out obsolete ideas.

"Our central purpose must be to create a stable environment of increased security for both East and West. We must aim at suppressing those nearly instinctive fears, frustrations, or ambitions which have so often been the reason for resorting to the use of force."

He noted that since the fading of détente there has been a "readiness to adapt to the worse rather than to exert our influence for the better."

He continued: "The responsibility for this lies partly, but by no means exclusively, with both superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union outstrip the rest of us in their global reach, their armaments, and their leadership responsibilities. Naturally, they differ greatly—and I am not committing the fallacy of describing them as equals in any moral sense at all. Nevertheless, they breathe an atmosphere common to themselves, and share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates."

He noted that both powers have points in common: They occupy continental land masses and are economically self-sufficient to a considerable degree. They have somewhat ambivalent relations with Europe and Asia and are demographically complex, and each focuses on the other in deciding policies.

"What is essential to assert is that . . . as war is

too important to leave to the generals, so the relationship between the superpowers may have become too charged with animosity . . . to be entrusted to them alone."

Mr. Trudeau said that in addition to NATO's two-track approach of deployment and negotiation, a "third rail" of "confidence and communications" is needed—"a rail charging our dealings with the other side with a current of political energy."

He also said at Guelph that the risk of miscalculation is too great not to try to re-build confidence through active political contact and consultation.

"Only in this way can the quality of credibility of efforts toward peace and security, from whatever quarter, be animated and reinforced."

In Montreal he said he had taken the elements of a program for political management of the current crisis to his European colleagues "for discussion and refinement" and had returned "with the assurance of their personal attention." The first element is the need "to establish as soon as possible in the course of the coming year, a forum in which global limits might be negotiated for all five nuclear-weapons states."

He said that forum should recognize the rights of the USA and the USSR as strategic equals and provide a mutually acceptable and stable framework for the relationship between the forces of the United Kingdom, France and China and those of the superpowers.

"In this way neither Britain, nor France, nor China need fear that their forces will be subject to restraints which do not recognize their own national interest."

A second element of his program is the need to shore up the Non-Proliferation Treaty which comes up for renewal in 1985.

"If the five nuclear-weapons states could begin to strengthen their side of the non-proliferation bargain, then the rest of us could more easily bring good sense to bear on those who have not yet signed on."

He said there should be incentives for Third World states to forego nuclear weapons—a linkage between disarmament and development, and a full range of safeguards governing the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

The third element of his initiative, he said, recognizes the dangerous concentration of forces—conventional as well as nuclear—in the