ORIMINAL LAW—BETTING—PLACE USED FOR BETTING—ARCHWAY ON STREET—BETTING ACT (16 & 17 VICT. C. 119) SS. 1, 3—(CR. CODE SS. 197, 198).

In *The Queen* v. *Humphrey* (1898) 1 Q.B. 875, the question to be determined was whether an archway which was a private thoroughfare leading from a public street into a yard containing dwelling houses, stables and workshops, which the prisoner was accustomed to resort to for the purpose of betting with persons who came to him there, was a "place" within the meaning of the Betting Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 119) ss. 1, 3, (Cr. Code, ss. 197, 198). The Court for Crown Cases reserved (Lord Russell, C.J., Hawkins, Wills, Kennedy and Ridley, JJ.), held that it was. The case is noteworthy for the observations made on the case of *Powell* v. *Kempton Park* (1897) 2 Q.B. 242 (see ante vol. 33, p. 762), which is said to have been a collusive action brought to get rid of the effect of the decision in *Hawke* v. *Dunn* (1897) 1 Q B. 579, (see ante vol. 33, p. 578). Lord Russell, C.J., seems to intimate that the decision of the Court of Appeal in *Powell* v. *Kempton Park*, would not be binding on the Court for Crown Cases reserved, although entitled to be treated with deference and respect. The judges are agreed, however, on the desirability of further legislation to get over the difficulty created by the difference of judicial opinion as to what is and what is not "a place" within the meaning of the Act.

MASTER AND SERVANT—FACTORY ACT, 1878 (41 & 42 VICT. C. 16), SS. 17, 83, 94, (R.S.O C. 256, SS. 6, 9, 14)—EMPLOYMENT OF YOUNG PERSON DURING PROHIBITED HOURS WORKING FOR AMUSEMENT.

In *Prior* v. *Slaithwaite S. Co.* (1898) 1 Q.B. 881, the defendants were charged with a breach of the Factory Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict., c. 16), (see R.S.O. c. 256, ss. 6, 9, 14) for permitting a young person in their employment to work during the time allowed for a meal. The evidence showed that the young person, contrary to his orders, and for his own amusement, had oiled part of the machinery during the hour allowed for a meal. The Court (Wills and Kennedy, JJ.) held that this was an employment within prohibited hours within the statute, and that the defendant company was liable for the statutory penalty.