eets West through the Berlin Wall.

The competitive nature of European nations may be revisited with a reunified Germany. Koch realizes that border disputes would most likely occur, much like those that dissected Czechoslovakia in the Munich

Pact. Even without a reunified Germany, other European groups within larger nations may clamour for sovereignty just as the East Germans, the Hungarians, and soon the Czechs demand self-determination from Soviet domination.

However, economic integration must also be given strong consideration. Both Lejnieks and Tom Keating, specialist in international politics with the department of political science, feel that the stability of the economic community, and not just that of the formal EEC, will override the instability of national differences. "The horrors of the past world wars will serve as a learning experience, and while conflicts will continue, they will not be as inflammatory," says Keating. He adds, "The economic integration of Europe will drive military and, in turn, political solutions that may quell conflicts."

The ties that East Germany is building with the West are the greatest single step to reducing East-West tensions. Lejnieks believes that this breakdown of the opposition blocs spells the death of Nato and the Warsaw Pact. Keating and Paltiel feel these military organizations are not ultimately going to disappear, but wil definitely change. "It would be best if they were to transform into umbrella organizations for a larger relationship of cooperation" suggests Paltiel. He feels that these changes would not necessarily mean a move to a more multi-polar world. "It wouldn't change the overwhelming military power of the U.S. and the Soviet Union... It may become multi-polar only if Nato dissolves into its North American and European elements, with Europe as its own defence area.

This scenario seems very likely to most speculators. Lejnieks extends this by suggesting that such a separation, which will entail a total removal of U.S. troops from Europe in the near future, will definitely create a world in which military and political competition


revisiting pre-cold war instability, the world will become a better place.

Keating does not foresee a drastic deviation from the world power balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but he speculates that the world will no longer be so strongly regarded as containing East-West tensions. The effect will be a focus on other conflict areas in the world. They will come to the forefront of our attention, and people will perceive these conflicts in new ways," says Keating, adding "solutions will come from looking at the local issues of those conflicts rather than in terms of East-West tension or Soviet and American intervention."

Another aspect of the change in East Germany's place in the world is discussed very gingerly. Most people give little credit to the theory that a reunified Germany could result in a restrengthened military power, although West Germany alone has the biggest army in Europe even with the removal of the superpower troops. Paltiel maintains that West Germany would in fact reduce its army to encourage closer links or even reunification with East Germany. In the international arena, comments speculating on a fourth Reich have been withheld, probably because this would hinder liberalization in East Germany and that it is currently largely implausible. Elie Wiesel, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1986, has stated that "whenever Germany was too powerful, it fell prey to the perilous temptations of ultranationalism." In a commentary in the New York Times, she adds "reactionary, anti-semitic journals are still be published in Germany; former Nazis still have their own associations... on of their leaders has been elected to high office in Berlin." Wiesel wants us to remember that the day when the Wall was opened already has historical significance: November 9 also marks the anniversary of the Kristallnacht.

Most would agree that the cost of snapping back against the reforms grows every day and





shifts to competing economic powers. Although Keating agrees that U.S. influence in Europe has been on the decline, and that the developments in East Germany will only accelerate U.S. troop removal, he feels that it is "too early to discount military power in the balance." Keating thinks that economic structures will not become paramount in world interaction. Conversely, Lejnieks perceives the possibility of wealthy nations like Japan and an integrated Europe as gaining greater global influence, of the kind that the superpowers now possess.

Lejnieks proposes that with the elimination of the artificial division of Europe, security will stop being the primary concern. He feels that the money freed from military expenditures will be redirected to domestic needs and other international projects. Ultimately, Lejnieks envisions that, if Europe can escape

becomes less possible. A return to the hard line seems inconceivable, regarding the mass of demands and the rapidity of change. The situation, however, remains volatile and uncertain. Paltiel asserts that the affects on communism will be felt. "Remnants of Marxist-Leninist regimes will exist," he says, "but will cease to have anything to do with Marxism or Leninism, but instead dictatorships of another name." He also emphasizes that "countries that have taken steps toward democracy will not necessarily retain their democratic hue."

Keating echoes that pressures for greater public involvement in communist countries will force the political elite to accomodate, but he says that they won't mirror the West.

Whatever the outcome, the whole of Europe is sure to be a setting for political and economic dynamics for decades to come.