

agencies and other donors on an *ad hoc* basis. The three Working Tables have directed these resources to projects overseen by participating agencies. For example, Table 1 has task forces on human rights and minorities and on gender issues (OSCE), on good governance (Council of Europe) and on education and youth; Table 2's economic development goals were set out by the World Bank, with projects being overseen by the EIB (infrastructure) and the EBRD (private-sector development); and Table 3 has two sub-tables, one dealing with arms control, de-mining and disaster preparedness and prevention, the other with EU "third-pillar" issues such as corruption, policing, immigration and the rule of law.

The Pact naturally invites comparison with the Marshall Plan, particularly inasmuch as it controls financial resources which dwarf those available to the region, and which it offers on condition that the recipients take initiatives to reform and to integrate on a regional basis. The EU's members constitute half of the participant states and three-quarters of the donors; they are also represented through the EU Commission, the EIB and the EBRD. Brussels seeks to complement the Pact with the SAA strategy and with a new, integrated aid programme, Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization and Stabilization (CARDS), replacing the previous patchwork of different programmes for the region. All this looks like a well-designed comprehensive strategy for the region with a built-in EU claim to leadership.

Although barely three years old, the Pact has already been subject to criticism both from within the region and from without. While it is arguably too early to judge its results, skeptics have focused on issues of duplication, structural excess, procedural complexity and slowness to deliver results – qualities some argue are characteristic of anything having to do with the EU. A related criticism of both the Pact and the SAA, is that the region's problems are too urgent to allow for the deliberate, complex processes of conditionality to work their transformative magic on the states of south eastern Europe. The EU, it is argued, should be more open and less demanding, lest it frustrate the well-intentioned in those states and open the way to nationalist backlash. (Steil and Woodward 1999)

Where has the emergence of a comprehensive EU approach to the region since the Kosovo campaign left the international protectorate in Bosnia? On the one hand, the changes of regime in Croatia and the FRY remove – or at least greatly reduce – centrifugal forces at work on the territorial arrangements agreed at Dayton. Moreover, the regional cooperation and integration promised by the Stability Pact can go a long way to restoring the links – markets, infrastructure, even social and cultural ties – between Bosnia and its neighbours, from which it once benefited in the Yugoslav federation. On the other hand, the diversion of western attention to the returned prodigals in Zagreb and Belgrade, and the perception that the main regional security risks now centre on Kosovo, may mean fewer resources devoted to Bosnia's ongoing problems. Continuing cuts to SFOR are the most visible manifestation of this trend; these seem driven more by needs elsewhere (especially after September 11, 2001) than by strong evidence that security on the ground has become self-sustaining.

EU policy in Bosnia now sits at the intersection of the seven-year old multilateral structures and processes based on Dayton, and the broader regional approach just described. From 1999 on, the Stability and Association process and the Stability Pact provided the governing framework. In 2000,